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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(3). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: WHETHER PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO 
MAINTAIN THIS ACTION. 
Standard of review: Determinations of the legal requirements for standing 
are reviewed for correctness. Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,r 10, 154 P.3d 808. 
Preservation: Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, Brown v. Division 
~ of Water Rights, 2008 UT App 353, ,I 6, 195 P.3d 933, and therefore can be raised 
at any time. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ,r 50, 123 P.3d 416. The issue of 
~ whether Plaintiffs had statutory standing was also raised in the lower court. (E.g., 
R. 1407; R. 1414-24; R. 1498-1503; R. 1885; R. 6819; R. 6864; R. 7009.) 
·-.:ij) 
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER 
COMPLETION OF THE SALE WAS "PREVENTED BY 
DEFAULT OF THE SELLER," OR WHETHER THE 
BUYER WAS READY, WILLING, ABLE, AND 
ACCEPTED BY THE SELLER. 
Standard of Review: A court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consol, 2000 UT 61, ,r 8, 6 P .3d 1129. 
Preservation: This issue was raised below. (E.g., R. 3655-70; R. 4054-74; 
~ R. 4434; R. 4517; R. 4634-35; R. 4958; R. 8382, pp. 10-35, 40-43, 53-59, 68-70, 
77-81; R. 8386, pp. 8-41; R. 8389, pp. 17-29, 46-49, 61.) 
1 
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
DISMISSING THE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT 
SCHY ANEVELDT INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN RULING 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT HE SIGNED THE REPC 
IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY RATHER THAN AS A 
MEMBER OF THE LLC. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's ruling on summary judgment presents 
a question of law and the legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of 
summary judgment are reviewed for correctness. Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10 
,I 8, 152 P.3d 312 (cited in Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App. 230, 285 
P.3d 802). 
Preservation: Schvaneveldt's lack of personal liability was raised below. 
(E.g., R. 927-929; R. 1890; R. 3664; R. 4426, p. 11; R. 5153-5154; R. 5512; R. 
8382, pp. 39-40; R. 8383, pp. 5-6, 11-13; R. 8388, p. 11.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND ORDINANCES 
Assumed name statute 
Utah Code § 42-2-10: 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business under an 
assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this 
chapter, and until the provisions of this chapter are complied with: 
( 1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, 
counterclaim, cross complaint, or proc~eding in any of the courts of 
this state; .... 
Revised Limited Liability Company Act (2006) 
Utah Code§ 48-2c-116: 
2 
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A member or manager of a [limited liability] company is not a proper party 
to proceedings by or against a company, except when the object is to enforce 
a member's or manager's right against, or liability to, the company. 
Utah Code§ 48-2c-601: 
[N]o organizer, member, manager, or employee of a company is personally 
liable under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, 
for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or omissions 
of the company or of any other organizer, member, manager, or employee of 
the company. 
Utah Code§ 48-2c-802(3): 
[U]nless the articles of organization expressly limit their authority, any 
member in a member-managed company, or any manager in a manager-
managed company, may sign, acknowledge, and deliver any document 
transferring or affecting the company's interest in real or personal property, 
and if the authority is not so limited, the document shall be conclusive in 
favor of a person who gives value without knowledge of the lack of 
authority of the person who signs and delivers the document. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings and disposition below 
This case arises out of a real estate transaction that went awry. The case has, 
...;; to put it mildly, a long and complicated history. For purposes of this appeal, 
however, the relevant history is relatively simple: 
ReMax Elite ( an assumed name whose owner was not identified) brought an 
interpleader action against two parties to a real estate contract, Emmett Warren and 
or Assigns (Buyers) and Still Standing Stables, LLC (Seller). The interpleader 
3 
action was to resolve the parties' dispute over an earnest money deposit being held 
by ReMax Elite. 
Nearly two years later, Buyers and Seller settled their dispute. Afterward, 
ReMax Elite asserted claims for a commission against Still Standing Stables, 
Charles Schvaneveldt (a member of the LLC), and Cathy Code (Schvaneveldt's 
girlfriend and later wife). 
Numerous amendments, motions, and cross motions were filecl throughout 
the litigation. See pp. 5-16, infra. Through the course of litigation, the issues for 
trial were narrowed significantly. As a matter of law, the trial court ruled that I) a 
valid commission agreement existed; 2) the plaintiffs had done everything they 
were required to do in order to earn a commission and therefore a commission was 
owing; 3) the sale had fallen through because the seller could not guarantee 
"insurable" access to the property; and 4) there was no basis upon which one of the 
defendants, the LLC, could be liable for the commission. 
At trial, the court instructed the jury as to each of these findings, and barred 
Schvaneveldt from offering any evidence challenging them. After the Plaintiffs' 
case in chief, the court granted a motion for directed verdict by Cathy Code, one of 
the two remaining defendants. Thus, while the trial was supposed to resolve who 
owed the commission, by the time it went to the jury, Schvaneveldt (in his 
individual capacity) was the jury's only remaining choice. Given that the judge 
4 
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had already instructed the jury that a commission was owed and the only question 
left was who owed it, the jury, not surprisingly, chose the sole defendant on the 
special verdict form. 1 
In this appeal, Schvaneveldt challenges the trial court's pretrial rulings, 
arguing that the jury should have been permitted to determine whether a 
i;. commission was owed at all and, if so, whether any such liability was by the LLC 
for whom Schvaneveldt was acting, rather than Schvaneveldt personally. There is 
an addition~! threshold issue, however, involving the Plaintiffs' standing to 
maintain this action. Because the latter issue requires additional background, and 
as required by U.R.A.P. 24(a)(7), Schvaneveldt hereby provides (as briefly as 
possible) the procedural history of the case wit];i record cites: 
As noted, this appeal arises from what began as an interpleader case brought 
by the dba ReMax Elite against the parties to a Real Estate Purchase Contract 
("REPC"), Emmett Warren/Assign WBL Development LLC (identified by ReMax 
.d) Elite as "Purchaser") and Still Standing Stables (identified as "Seller"). (R. 1.) 
From this simple beginning, the case grew in complexity. 
Still Standing Stables answered and counterclaimed against ReMax Elite and 
Buyers' real estate agent, Tim Shea. (R. 30.) Buyers answered, adding a cross-
1 As the trial court summarized, "[T]his Court ruled prior to going into trial, that 
the only two people who would have any potential liability in this case would be 
the two principal people here in this courtroom .... " (R. 8385, pp. 27-28:23-1.) 
5 
claim against Still Standing Stables and a third-party complaint against Charles 
"Chuck" Schvaneveldt. (R. 52.) Schvaneveldt and Still Standing Stables 
answered Buyers' third party complaint and cross-claim (R. 95), and filed a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings (R. 110), which was denied. (R. 190.) 
The pleadings were amended at various stages throughout 2007, some of 
these amendments occurring while discovery proceeded. Early in 2008, Buyers 
and their assign reached a settlement with Still St~ding Stables and Schvaneveldt, 
and the claims between them were dismissed by the court. (R. 538.) 
ReMax Elite and Buyers' agent Shea then amended their pleadings to 
demand a sales commission from Still Standing Stables under the For Sale By 
Owner commission agreement ("FSBO"). (R. 554.) The trial court ultimately 
barred Shea from pursuing this claim, as a claim for commission can only be 
brought by a licensed broker, not an agent. (R. 1081.) 
After a large portion of discovery was complete, Still Standing Stables 
added as additional third-party defendants Hilary "Skip" 0. Wing, Shane Thorpe, 
Scott Quinney, Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation dba ReMax Elite, Aspenwood 
Realty, LLC, Aspenwood Elite, and ReMax Realty. (R. 828.) It was alleged that 
ReMax Elite was simply a dba of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation. The other 
third-party defendants participated, it was alleged, in the management of 
Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, either as principals, subsidiari~s, or dbas. Id. 
6 
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ReMax and Shea then amended their complaint and third-party counterclaim 
again, adding as a defendant Schvaneveldt and as a Third Party Defendant his wife, 
Cathy Code. (R. 1232.) When answering this amended pleading, Schvaneveldt 
included as a third-party complaint the same causes of action against the 
Aspenwood parties previously alleged by Still Standing Stables. (R. 1303.) 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a ruling as a 
matter of law that they were entitled to a commission. (R. 1561.) This was 
successfully stayed pending discovery, and defendants responded when the stay 
was lifted nearly two years later. (R. 3655.) 
Meanwhile, Still Standing Stables and Schvaneveldt filed a motion for 
summary judgment contending that ReMax Elite, a dba, could not collect a 
commission because it was not a broker nor owned by a broker. (R. 1407.) The 
trial court denied the motion. (R. 1885.) 
The court also denied motions by both Schvaneveldt and Code seeking 
dismissal as individual defendants on the grounds that they were acting on behalf 
of the limited liability company Still Standing Stables, not as individuals. (R. 
1885; R. 1890.) 
Based upon arguments made by Plaintiffs in opposing the dismissal of 
Schvaneveldt and Code (i.e., that those defendants were liable and not the LLC), 
7 
Still Standing Stables then filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of its 
own liability (R. 2394). 
While this motion was pending, and despite already being named as third-
party defendants in the litigation, Skip Wing, Elite Legacy Corporation, and 
Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation moved to add themselves as plaintiffs, 
asserting that ReMax Elite was their dba. (R. 2318.) Shortly thereafter, these 
plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on all of Still Standing Stables' claims 
against them (R. 2887). Still Stan~ing Stables filed a cross motion on the issue of 
breach of fiduciary duty. (R. 3094.) 
While these motions were pending, Still Standing Stables and Schvaneveldt 
filed their response to Plaintiffs' third amended answer and counterclaim. (R. 
3604.) (This was the answer and counterclaim in which the Elite and Aspenwood 
entities had been joined as plaintiffs, along with Skip Wing.) 
It took several years, but the characters on the stage of the litigation were 
beginning to gel. On the plaintiff's side, Wing was a principal broker, and 
associated with him, he alleged, were a mixture of persons and entities that 
together constituted his brokerage: entities, associate brokers and agents. These 
included (by their narratives) Tim Shea, Elite Legacy Corporation, Aspen wood 
Real Estate Corporation, Aspenwood Elite Legacy Corporation, Shane Thorpe, 
Scott Quinney, Aspenwood Realty, LLC, Aspenwood Elite, and ReMax Realty. 
8 
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Wing alleged that Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation owned the ReMax Elite 
dba. (Later, ReMax Elite Legacy Corporation would also claim to own the ReMax 
Elite dba (R. 2364).) On the defendants' side figured Still Standing Stables, its 
member Schvaneveldt, and his wife, Code. 
After a two-year hiatus (caused in part by stays for mandatory mediation, 
discovery, and Tim Shea's bankruptcy), the plaintiffs filed an opposition (R. 3644) 
to Still Standing Stables' motion for summary judgment on its liability (R. 2394), 
and Still Standing Stables, Schvaneveldt, and Code filed an opposition (R. 3655) to 
the plaintiffs' motion to secure partial summary judgment on their claim to collect 
the commission (R. 1561 ). While these motions were pending, the plaintiffs 
responded to the counterclaims and third-party complaint brought by Still Standing 
Stables, Schvaneveldt, and Code. (R. 3989.) 
In March 2012, the trial court held oral argument on Shea's and Still 
Standing Stables' cross motions for summary judgment. The court ruled orally 
~ that, as a matter of law, the sole reason the transaction had failed was that 
"insurable" access to the property could not be obtained. (R. 83 89.) In light of this 
ruling, the court dismissed all of Still Standing Stables' tort claims because Still 
Standing Stables could not show that any alleged tortious conduct by the Plaintiffs 
caused it any harm. Id. 
9 
Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion (R. 4401) to dismiss the defendants' 
second third-party complaint, arguing _that it amounted to the same pleading that 
had been dismissed by the court in its recent summary judgment ruling. All three 
defendants opposed this motion, as the grant of summary judgment was not final 
and did not affect the rights of Schvaneveldt or Code. (R. 4509.) The defendants 
also filed a cross motion to amend their counterclaims. (R. 4507.) 
Yet another motion was filed in this timeframe, the Plaintiffs' second motion 
for partial summary judgment (R. 4504), in which they asked the court to rule that 
Schvaneveldt and Code were responsible for paying the commission. The court 
did not ultimately rule on that motion. 
At a hearing in July 2012, the court granted Plaintiffs' motion for partial 
summary judgment (R. 1561), ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to a commission 
as a matter of law. (R. 8382.) The court ruled that changes that had been made by 
Shea to the REPC after the parties signed it were "a red herring" and legally 
irrelevant. The court further foreclosed any possibility of alleging fraud at the trial. 
Finally, the court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. (R. 4972.) 
The district court also granted Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the third-party 
complaint, and denied defendants' motion to amend. (R. 5047.) 
The day before trial, the court dismissed Still Standing Stables as a 
defendant. (R. 8383, pp. 17-20; R. 5613.) The case then proceeded to trial against 
10 
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Schvaneveldt and Code. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case in chief, 
Schvaneveldt moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. (R. 5317.) 
Code moved for a directed verdict, which was granted. (R. 5424.) The court 
vl; told the jury that it had concluded there was no basis for liability against Code, and 
had dismissed her from the case. "Therefore, as a result of my ruling, you will 
~ consider only the liability of Chuck Schvaneveldt in this case." (R. 8386 pp. 42-
43.) 
'lid 
The jury entered a verdict against the sole rema1rung defendant, 
Schvaneveldt, assessing damages in the amount of $30,000. (R. 5388.) 
Schvaneveldt filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. 5393), 
which was denied. (R. 5615.) The plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, alleging 
that the damages the jury assessed were not consistent with the evidence. (R. 
5450.) Rather than grant the motion, the trial court instead opted to increase the 
judgment to $130,875. (R. 5950.) The court later added an award of attorney fees, 
for a total judgment against Schvaneveldt of $362,485.96. Id. 
Schvaneveldt filed his own motion for new trial (R. 6200), which was 
denied. (R. 6510). Other post-trial motions went forward, and ultimately Still 
Standing Stables was awarded $2,659.73 in costs. (R. 6732.) When an attempt 
was made to collect these costs, Skip Wing denied that he was liable for them 
because, Wing said, he was not a party to the contract on which ReMax Elite was 
11 
sumg. This prompted Still Standing Stables to bring a motion to identify real 
parties in interest, the nub of which was a contention that none of the plaintiffs had 
standing to pursue a commission. (R. 6819.) Schvaneveldt filed a companion 
motion, seeking dismissal of all of the named commission claim plaintiffs with 
prejudice and to have the judgment struck or otherwise made void. (R. 6864.) 
Schvaneveldt's central argument was that a man named Dale Quinlan was 
the principal broker who had established, registered, and owned the dba ReMax 
Elite, the status of which had vexed the entire litigation. At least two of the 
Plaintiffs had claimed that they owned the dba. Now Quinlan appeared with 
documentation from the State of Utah that it was his. Quinlan also submitted an 
affidavit indicating that he had never transferred any commission agreement or 
contract rights to any other individual nor entity. Quinlan owned the ReMax Elite 
dba at the time of the execution of the FSBO and REPC in 2006. As such, the 
defendants argued that he was required to be the party seeking the commission. 
Thickening the plot, Quinlan was no longer a principal broker at the time of the 
FSBO and REPC. Because Quinlan was neither a principal broker nor named as a 
party, the defendants argued, the commission claims asserted by his dba were void. 
Id. 
While these motions were pending, Still Standing Stables and Schvaneveldt 
entered into a settlement agreement with Quinlan and his dba ReMax Elite to 
12 
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dismiss ReMax Elite's claims related to the commission. (R. 6990-91.) Settlement 
was limited to those parties identified as parties to the commission agreement, 
reserving any claims that Still Standing Stables or Schvaneveldt might have against 
others (Wing and the amalgam of others constituting his brokerage who remained 
as litigants). Id 
The trial court denied Still Standing's and Schvaneveldt's motions. (R. 
7009.) The court first concluded that Wing could not avoid liability for attorney 
fees under the FSBO by characterizing himself as a nonparty to the agreement. 
The court also said that it was "dismay[ ed]" at the reassertion of standing 
arguments by the defendants at this point in the proceedings. While standing may 
be raised at any time during litigation, the court reasoned that it had lost 
jurisdiction once a final judgment was entered. After expressing its hesitancy to 
even engage in any analysis at all, the court concluded that the evidence suggesting 
that Wing was not the principal broker could have been found earlier, and therefore 
~ defendants' standing arguments were untimely. Id. 
Schvaneveldt then filed a Rule 52(b) motion to amend findings in the final 
judgment. (R. 7088.) He requested that all three named plaintiffs be removed 
from the commission judgment because none of them was the actual party to the 
FSBO agreement. He also requested that the court recognize as an undisputed fact 
that Dale Quinlan was the certified and record owner of the dba ReMax Elite. He 
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finally requested that a letter of transfer dated 9 March 2006, purporting to transfer 
the dba to Wing, and the Aspenwood articles of incorporation (which might also be 
used to substantiate a transfer of the dba) be authenticated. Schvaneveldt 
contended that neither document was executed by Quinlan, and submitted an 
expert report to that effect. (R. 7115.) 
Just over a month after filing his rule 52(b) motion, Schvaneveldt filed a rule 
60(b) motion, the substance of which was that overwhelming documentation now 
showed that Skip Wing was not the principal broker of the dba ReMax Elite, and 
therefore there was no proper party plaintiff in the action. (R. 7287.) 
No ruling was issued on the motions for approximately nine months. At that 
point, Schvaneveldt submitted to the court supplemental exhibits and an additional 
memorandum in support of his rule 52(b) motion. (R. 7854.) This evidence also 
showed that Skip Wing was never a broker for the dba ReMax Elite. Id. 
The court denied the rule 52(b) motion. (R. 8234.) The court found that 
information contained within the Department of Commerce (including a 
determination by the State that the purported 2006 transfer documents were 
forgeries, and that the dba had never been transferred by Quinlan), could have been 
discovered before trial. The court ruled that a dba is an asset, and could be held in 
a "somewhat segregated capacity, where legal title is held in one particular name, 
but equitable interests are actually owned by someone else." (R. 8240-41.) The 
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court speculated that Quinlan "may have been simply functioning in his capacity as 
a participant in the business entity that owned the dba of ReMax Elite, when his 
name was placed on that document [registration of the dba]." With respect to 
Wing, the court stated that "to the extent that Skip Wing is identified as a party in 
these proceedings, or as the holder of any claims, that identification is Mr. Skip 
J:J Wing, in his representative capacity, as principal broker for the brokerage, or as an 
agent or representative of the brokerage, and does not represent his individual and 
personal ownership of those claims." (R. 8243.) 
The trial court also denied the rule 60(b) motion. (R. 8254.) The court 
concluded that relief under Rule 60(b )( 6) was not available. With respect to Rule 
60(b)(5), the court ascribed no legal significance to Quinlan's settlement with the 
defendants because Quinlan's ownership status had not been conclusively 
established. With respect to Rule 60(b)(4), the court noted that arguments 
regarding standing had already been rejected in previous rulings. The court said 
v<1 that there were two separate questions at issue: Is there a properly registered dba 
for the business entity that asserted the claim, and who owns that dba?. There may 
be argument about who owns a dba, the court said, but this did not necessarily go 
to whether the lawsuit could be maintained by the dba in question. (R. 8263.) 
Related to other post-trial motions concerning the ownership of the dba, Still 
w) 
Standing Stables not only had settled all outstanding claims with Quinlan and 
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ReMax Elite, but it had also had secured ownership of and registered the ReMax 
Elite dba. Based on these facts, Still Standing filed a motion to be substituted as 
plaintiff under Rule 25 as the rightful owner of the dba. (R. 8110.) The motion 
was denied. (R. 8444, pp. 30-36.) All parties appealed some aspect of the court's 
rulings and final judgments. 
Statement of facts relevant to issues on appeal 
The For Sale By Owner ("FSBO '') agreement 
In January 2006, former defendant Cathy Code, then a girlfriend of Chuck 
Schvaneveldt, ran an advertisement for a piece of property in Weber County, Utah. 
(R. 3266, pp. 14-16.) The Property was owned by a limited liability company 
called Still Standing Stables. (R. 660 ,r 1.) Schvaneveldt was a member of the 
LLC. (R. 3126 ,r 1.) 
A real estate agent named Tim Shea saw the advertisement and contacted 
Code, purporting to have some pot<?ntially interested buyers. (R. 3266-67, pp. 16-
17.) On January 20, 2006, Shea sent a proposed Real Estate Purchase Contract 
("REPC") to Code along with a For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement & 
Agency Disclosure ("FSBO"). (R. 3271, p. 45.) A copy of the FSBO is attached 
hereto as Add.Exh. 5.2 
2 There was a dispute below as to whether this FSBO was one that Schvaneveldt 
authorized Code to sign, and that she did sign. That is immaterial to resolution of 
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The FSBO contained the following prov1s1on regarding a comm1ss1on 
("brokerage fee"): 
2. BROKERAGE FEE. The Seller agrees to pay the Company, 
irrespective of agency relationship( s ), as compensation for services, a 
Brokerage Fee in the amount of$ __ or 3% of the acquisition price of the 
Property, if the Seller accepts an offer from Emmett Warren and or Assigns 
(the "Buyer"), or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf, to purchase or 
exchange the Property. The Seller agrees that the Brokerage Fee shall be 
due and payable, from the proceeds of the Seller, on the date of recording of 
closing documents for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the 
Buyer or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf. If the sale or exchange is 
prevented by default of the Seller, the Brokerage Fee shall immediately be 
due and payable to the Company. 
(Add.Exh. 5, p. 1 § 2.) 
The FSBO also contained a provision addressing certain seller warranties: 
4. SELLER WARRANTIES / DISCLOSURES. The Seller warrants that 
the individuals or entity listed above as the "Seller" represents all of the 
record owners of the Property. The Seller warrants that it has marketable 
title and an established right to sell, lease, or exchange the Property. The 
Seller agrees to execute the necessary documents of conveyance. The Seller 
agrees to furnish buyer with good and marketable title, and to pay at 
Settlement, for a standard coverage owner's policy of title insurance for the 
buyer in the amount of the purchase price. The Seller agrees to fully inform 
the Agent regarding the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property. 
The Seller agrees to personally complete and sign a Seller's Property 
Condition Disclosure form. 
(Add.Exh. 5, p. 1 § 4.) 
The FSBO incorporated the Seller's Property Condition Disclosure Form 
referenced in Section 4. See id., § 13 ("ENTIRE AGREEJ\.1ENT. This 
the issues on appeal, and therefore it is assumed for purposes of argument that 
Code signed the FSBO and that she was authorized to do so by Schvaneveldt. 
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Commission Agreement, including the Seller's Property Condition Disclosure 
F onn contain the entire agreement between the parties relating to the subject 
matter of this Commission Agreement. This Commission Agreement may not be 
modified or amended except in writing signed by the parties hereto.") The Seller's 
disclosure form is discussed below. 
TheREPC 
The agent, Shea, identified his buyers as "Emmett Warren and or Assigns." 
(R. 857.) Shea initially conveyed a $6,000,000 offer from Buyers through a 
proposed REPC on January 20, 2006. Schvaneveldt submitted a counteroffer, 
which lapsed by its terms when Buyers did not respond. (R. 4710-11.) 
On February 6, 2006, Shea submitted another offer from Buyers. Other than 
a reduced offer amount ($4,362,500), the proposed REPC was identical to the 
earlier lapsed one. (Compare Add.Exh. 6 and R. 38.) Both REPCs were prepared 
by Shea. (R. 3270-71, pp. 44-48.) According to Shea, he was acting solely as an 
agent of Buyers in connection with the deal. (R. 3286, p. 245; see also Add.Exh. 6 
(FSBO) p. 1 § 5 (stating that Broker and Agent "are representing the Buyer" and 
are "the Buyer's agent").)3 
The REPC prepared by Shea identified the Property as "Land LLC, Still 
Standing Stables also described as Parcel # 23-006-0006 City of Huntsville, 
3 But see R. 7 (modified copy of REPC on which Shea checked boxes stating that 
Listing Agent and Listing Broker represented "Seller" as well as "Buyer"). 
18 
@ 
~I 
County of Morgan, State of Utah, ZIP 84310." (Add.Exh. 6, § 1.) (Morgan was 
later crossed out and Weber written in.) 
Shea admits that, when meeting with Schvaneveldt, he (Shea) represented 
that he had "cash buyers." (R. 3268, p. 22.) According to Schvaneveldt, Shea 
represented that Buyers included an owner of the Arizona Diamondbacks 
~ professional baseball team. (R. 3128, ,r,r 16, 23.) Schvaneveldt contended that a 
cash transaction was consistent with a space left blank next to the "loan" provision 
in the financing section of the proposed REPC. (R. 3113.) 
On February 7, 2006, Schvaneveldt signed an Acceptance of Offer to 
Purchase. (R. 861.) The Plaintiffs claim that the agent, Shea, did not keep the 
original of this document; instead, the Plaintiffs produced and relied on a black and 
white copy. (R. 1096 ,r 7; R. 1135.) 
On its face, the signature of Schvaneveldt on the copy appears to be 
irregular. In particular, the words "Chuck Schvaneveldt" are on the far left side of 
,..i) the page, inside the margin, followed by an unexplained white space: 
~ 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFERJREJ~CTION 
. . . :CHECfCOt(E: ·· . 
. ·. '--~~~TANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller ~pis th, -~,q(ng offer on the terms al1d eondtttanc spedfied _ 
.. . -
{llm$) (Seller's Signature) (Data) (Time) 
--------- ~.,,;;f~UJ~M ........ .=-~a'tt--Ai:?W.;;;.,,a:;.-::1'_-,,;lt,.s,,~---...;;i .. ~...... t: ~f~f'4..,..~""""!-~flb/~ .... • '-~'.A..,_1,_t/. .. . ~___.LS' 
(SeOea' Names) (PLEASE PRIHTJ (Nob Address) (Zip Codo) {Phono) 
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(See Add.Exh. 6 (REPC), signature page.) 
During cross-examination at trial, Schvaneveldt attempted to explain that the 
copy only contained part of his signature, because on the original he had written 
"Member" following his name, which appeared to have been "whited out" on the 
copy. (R. 8385, pp. 13-15:9-9; see also R. 3126 (averring that his signature on the 
REPC was "forged" [sic].) During a break, the trial court agreed with Plaintiffs 
that Schvaneveldt's testimony was barred by the court's earlier ruling that the LLC 
had no liability as a matter of law. (Id., pp. 27-41.) (The court had also barred 
Schvaneveldt from mentioning that the Plaintiffs did not produce an original of the 
REPC (R. 8384, p. 177).) 
The court directed the parties to "stipulate" that there was no evidence of 
whited out text on the REPC, despite Schvaneveldt' s testimony to the contrary and 
the face of the document itself. (R. 8385, pp. 40-41.) The court told the jury: 
Notwithstanding the testimony of Schvaneveldt, the parties stipulate 
that there is no evidence that any document has been whited out nor are the 
defendants aware of any such documents. Pursuant to the Court's earlier 
ruling, there is no liability on Still Standing liability [sic] a limited liability 
company; therefore, do not consider anything you have heard to suggest 
liability on Still Standing liability company as opposed to the defendants that 
are present in the courtroom. 
(Id., p. 42:18-1.)4 
4 In his closing argument, the Plaintiffs' counsel cited this statement by the court as 
proving that Schvaneveldt was a liar: "I looked at this and I say, is that your 
signature? Yeah, that's my signature and then he says, and you know, I put 
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The trial court also prohibited Schvaneveldt from offering evidence at trial 
regarding other alterations the agent admitted making to the original REPC after it 
was signed by Schvaneveldt. For example, as discussed in Point II below, Shea 
added "TBD" in the blank space next to "loan". The original reads: 
. .t.PURCHASe PNCe The purdlas& ;mco forth• PtopOrty ls WP25QQ 
: Tha pun:ttasa price wUI -bO paid a, faitowr. $.25JJQQ l•> EarnHt Money Depo,n. Undor certain eondUlon~ dt•crU,ad ln thla Contract THIS 
• . DEPc,slT MAY BECOM~ TOTALLY NON-R!FUNOASLE. · 
, ____ (b) N•w ~nn. 8uyGf ogrves to apply for.one or mare cf the foffowing loans: 
r""\ (XJ t:ONVeffTIONAL ( lOTHER(spedfy) ___________ _ 
If tile Joan tt·to 1ndudo any particular tenn&. then check below and giw detait&: 
f t ~PECIFl~ LOAN 'nRMS . 
$ ____ (~) Salftr Ftnanofnt. (aoo attached $oiler Financing Addendum, If applieabla) 
$. ____ (d) Othw(splclfr). . · . · · . 
'----<•) Balano. of Pvrdlua Peke tn Cash at S•ttl•m•nt. $:136250.Q PURCHASE PRIC8. Total of Unoa (4) tflrough (a) 
The version as modified by Shea reads: 
'member' there or - or something to the effect 'member' should be there, I don't 
know what happened. I think somebody whited out that document. Jury leaves the 
room ... , and you come back in and the stipulation by the parties was is that there is 
no evidence that any of these documents have been whited out. So why go to the 
jury and tell the jury, I think that's been whited out, you even heard him say and 
over here, look here, there's been something there, and he went through all those 
documents and wanted to claim-why? Because he falsely testified about an 
important matter in this case because he doesn't want you to put his personal 
signature on those documents." (R. 8387, p. 45:7-23.) 
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With respect to agency disclosure, the original signed REPC reads: 
As later modified by Shea, the REPC read: 
In a pretrial ruling,. the trial court ruled that Shea's modifications, and the 
plaintiffs' representation of the modified version as the original, were irrelevant 
because Schvaneveldt did not learn about either until after the lawsuit was filed, 
and because as a matter of law Shea's modifications were just made for "internal" 
purposes. (R. 8384, p. 72:914.)5 
5 To rule as a matter of law that Shea's modifications were merely routine 
administrative annotations seems inconsistent with Shea's own evolving story as to 
how they occurred: At various times, he denied making the modifications after the 
REPC was signed, acknowledged that they were made after it was signed, 
acknowledged it appeared to be his handwriting, suggested that someone else in his 
office might have done it, or speculated that "Chuck [Schvaneveldt] could have 
wrote that TBD." (R. 3274, pp. 149-150; R. 3290-3291, pp. 308-311.) 
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Pertinent provisions of the REPC 
The REPC submitted by the Buyer and signed by Schvaneveldt includes 
several relevant sections. Section 2 (typed in smaller font to more accurately 
depict its appearance on the REPC) provides: 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The purchase price for the Property is $4362500 
The purchase price will be paid as follows: 
$25,000 (a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Contract THIS DEPOSIT 
MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
$____ (b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for one or more of the following loans: 
[X] CONVENTIONAL [ ] OTHER (Specify) _____________ _ 
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details: 
[] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS _________________ _ 
$____ (c) Seller Financing. (see attached Seller Financing Addendum, if applicable) 
$____ (d) Other(specify). ___________________ _ 
$____ (e) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement. 
$4362500 PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (e) 
Section 3 of the REPC, addressing Settlement and Closing, states: 
3. SETTLE:rvIBNT AND CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on the 
Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24( c ), or on a date upon which 
Buyer and Seller agree in writing. "Settlement" shall occur only when all 
of the following have been completed: ( a) Buyer and Seller have signed 
and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents 
required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instructions 
or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under 
these documents ( except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been 
delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office in the form of 
collected or cleared funds; and (c) any monies required to be paid by 
Seller under these documents have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or 
to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds .... 
The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement has been 
completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the 
proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by the Lender to Seller or 
to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents 
have been recorded in the office of the county recorder. The actions 
described in parts (i) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be 
completed within four calendar days of Settlement. 
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Section 8 of the REPC addressed Buyers' due diligence obligations and right 
to cancel: 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER'S DUE 
DILIGENCE. Buyer's obligation to purchase under this Contract (check 
applicable boxes): 
( a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content 
of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7; 
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical 
condition inspection of the Property; ... 
If any of items 8( a) through 8(g) are checked in the affirmative, then 
Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply. 
The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to 
as Buyer's "Due Diligence." Unless otherwise provided in this 
Contract, Buyer's Due Diligence shall be paid for by Buyer and shall 
be conducted by individuals or entities or Buyer's choice. Seller 
agrees to cooperate with Buyer's Due Diligence and with a final pre-
closing inspection under Section 11. 
8.1. Due Diligence Deadline. No later than the Due Diligence 
Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) Buyer shall: (a) complete all of 
Buyer's Due Diligence; and (b) determine if the results of Buyer's 
Due Diligence are acceptable to Buyer. 
8.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the results of 
Buyer's Due Diligence are unacceptable, Buyer may, no later than the 
Due Diligence Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing 
written notice to Seller, whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall 
be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of 
objections. 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence 
Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel this Contract as provided in 
Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the 
Buyer's Due Diligence, The Buyer's Due Diligence shall be deemed 
approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenced in Sections 8(a) 
through 8(g), including but not limited to, any financing contingency, 
shall be deemed waived by Buyer. 
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Section 10 of the REPC addressed certain seller warranties: 
10. SELLER WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to 
the Property and will convey good and marketable title to Buyer at 
Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept 
title to the Property subject to the following matters of record: 
easements, deed restrictions, CC&R' s (meaning covenants, conditions 
and restrictions), and rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the 
Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 
8. Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases 
affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing. Buyer agrees 
to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association 
dues, utilities, and other services provided to the Property after 
Closing. Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, 
trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants. 
Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and 
homeowners association dues .... 
Section 13 of the REPC addressees the authority of signers: 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, 
partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company or other entity, the 
person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her 
authority to do so and to bind Buyer and Seller. 
Section 14 of the REPC is an integration clause: 
14. CO:rvlPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its 
addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, constitutes the 
entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any 
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings 
or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed 
except by written agreement of the parties. 
Section 24 of the REPC set forth the deadlines for Seller's Disclosures, 
Buyer's Due Diligence, and Settlement. (The deadlines were handwritten.) 
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24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the 
following deadlines shall apply to this Contract: 
(a) Seller Disclosure Deadline 15 DAYS FROM WRITTEN 
ACCEPTANCE (Date) 
(b) Due Diligence Deadline 60 DAYS FROM WRITTEN 
ACCEPTANCE (Date) 
( c) Settlement Deadline 90 DAYS FROM WRITTEN 
ACCEPTANCE (Date)6 
Seller's Property Condition Disclosure form 
As noted above, the FSBO incorporates the seller's disclosure form. See pp. 
17-18, supra. That disclosure form was prepared by Shea on February 9, 2006, 
two days after Schvaneveldt signed the REPC. (R. 2950, 3127 ,r 24.) It included 
this information: 
SELLER NAME STILL STANDING STABLES, LLC 
PROPERTY ADDRESS Parcel No 23-006-0006 
*** 
6. BOUNDARIES & ACCESS 
E. Are you aware of any unrecorded easements, or claims for 
easements, affecting the Property? Yes. If "Yes," please describe, to your 
knowledge, the nature and approximate location of any such easement(s): 
66 foot wide easement to Garth Allen, Jenna & Jeff Holt, Lesley Ann Becky 
J arl Allen - previously provided. 
6 Under Section 21, "Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this 
Contract. Extensions must be agreed to in writing by all parties ..... " No claim is 
made that the deadlines in the REPC were extended. 
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F. To your knowledge, is there direct access to the Property 
from a public street/road? No. 
G. If direct access to the Property is not from a public 
street/road, to your knowledge, is there direct access to Property through 
( check applicable box): Yes. Private Easement. 
(R. 2952 § 6.) 
According to Shea and the Plaintiffs, Buyers became concerned during the 
;.iJ due diligence period about whether insurable access to the property existed. (R. 
3278-85; R. 3445-46; also R. 8384, p. 11.) Schvaneveldt contended there was 
access, due to his purchase of an additional five acres after a previous adverse 
court ruling. (R. 3128 ,I 25.) Various title insurance companies, however, were 
only willing to offer policies that excluded a guarantee of access to the property. 
(R. 2903-07.) 
Despite their claimed concerns about insurable access, Buyers did not 
submit a written notice of objections or cancel the REPC pursuant to Section 8.2. 
The trial court ultimately ruled that Buyers had waived their objections regarding 
access pursuant to Section 8 of the REPC. (R. 8386, pp. 83-84:17-1.)7 
7 Section 8( a) of the REPC stated that Buyers' obligation to buy was conditioned 
on their acceptance of the Seller's disclosures after completing due diligence. 
Under the REPC, if the Buyer has not canceled the REPC or objected by the 
expiration of the Due Diligence Deadline, "[t]he Buyer's Due Diligence shall be 
deemed approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenced in Sections 8(a) 
through 8(g) ... shall be deemed waived by Buyer." § 8.3. When the due diligence 
period passed without cancellation, Shea admits telling Schvaneveldt that the 
Buyers' earnest money check was now on the line. (R. 3289, pp. 303-304.) The 
court ruled: "In failing to object to the access issue during the due diligence 
27 
On May _3, 2006, Seller executed closing documents and a runner delivered 
the documents. (R. 180.) It is undisputed that Buyers did not show up at the 
closing. 
On cross-motions filed by Shea and Still Standing Stables, the trial court 
ruled as a matter of law that the sole reason that the sale had fallen through was 
due to an inability to obtain insured access to the property. (R. 8389 pp. 52-54; 
also R. 5049-50.) The court applied this ruling to other parties, including 
Schvaneveldt, as law of the case. (R. 5050-51.) As noted above, the court ruled 
that Buyers had waived their objections to the access issue before the closing date.8 
The lawsuit and Plaintiffs ' identity/standing 
Facts regarding the identity of the Plaintiffs and their (non)status as principal 
brokers are set forth in the procedural history above, pp. 11-16, supra, and 
additionally at pp. 35-36, infra. 
period, the buyer essentially assented to continue with the sale despite the access 
issue. I mean, that's the natural consequence under the terms of the agreement ... 
Where the due diligence period passed without objection, the contingency here was 
apparently waived and the buyer gave up his right to object." (R. 8386, pp. 83-
84: 17-1.) See Load Zone Marketing and Management, LLC, v. Clark, 2014 UT 
App 194, ,r 13, 333 P.3d 1255 (due diligence conditions are waived if buyer fails to 
exercise his right to cancel before the deadline). 
8 The plaintiffs also claimed that Seller had refused to provide a "general" warranty 
deed as referenced in the REPC. Seller's attorney Gretta Spendlove, however, had 
proposed a special warranty deed, and Buyers had stated a willingness to accept it. 
(R. 18.) A fact issue therefore existed, and the trial court did not rule on it. 
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The key pretrial rulings 
As noted above, various motions were filed by the parties during the 
litigation. Those included a motion for partial summary judgment filed by the 
Plaintiffs arguing that they were entitled to a commission as a matter of law, and 
motions/cross-motions for summary judgment by Still Standing Stables, Chuck 
~ Schvaneveldt, Cathy Code, Tim Shea, and Skip Wing. 
Of import to this appeal, the court ruled that the Plaintiffs had done 
everything they were required to do in order to earn the commission. The 
remaining issue was who, between Schvaneveldt and Code, was obligated to pay it. 
(R. 8383, pp. 27-28 ("I have previously ruled that the plaintiffs satisfied all of their 
obligations to the FSBO and have therefore earned a commission.... And 
therefore, the only remaining issue from the July 12th decision was, who's going to 
have liability for this commission that has been earned? And I think at this point, I 
think it's not the LLC, I think it's either Cathy Code, Chuck Schvaneveldt or both 
..J of them and I think that's what this trial is going to be about this coming week.") 
Consistent with the narrow issues allowed to be presented to the jury, the 
court instructed the jury at the beginning of trial that one or more of the remaining 
two defendants, Schvaneveldt and Code, had entered into a commission agreement 
with the plaintiffs, that plaintiffs had done everything required to earn the 
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commission, that a commission was owed, and that the jury's sole task was to 
determine who owed it: 
The plaintiffs and defendants were involved in an attempt to sell a piece of 
property. Defendants, Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code, are the sellers 
of the property, which is owned by Still Standing Stable, LC, that's a limited 
liability company. Chuck Schvaneveldt is one of the owners of Still 
Standing Stable, LC. Plaintiffs are the real estate brokers who attempted to 
find someone to buy the land. Plaintiffs entered into a contract with one or 
more of the defendants to find a buyer for the land. That contract is called 
the for sale by owner and you'll hear throughout the trial, it referred to as the 
FSBO or the FSBO commission agreement. 
In performance of the FSBO agreement, plaintiffs produced a ready, willing 
and able buyer that defendants accepted. The buyer and Chuck 
Schvaneveldt, one of the defendants, signed a real estate purchase contract.. .. 
The REPC between Schvaneveldt and the buyer is a binding contract and 
satisfies the terms of the FSBO. Ultimately, the ·transaction failed and the 
buyer did not purchase the land because the defendants could not provide 
title insurance that guaranteed access to the property. Importantly, however, 
the FSBO agreement does not require that the land actually be sold in order 
for plaintiffs to earn a commission, only that the buyer be ready, willing and 
able to purchase; thus, the Court previously ruled that plaintiffs satisfied 
their obligations under the FSBO and therefore, have earned a commission. 
In this trial, your duty as jurors is to determine whether the defendants are 
responsible to pay the commission to plaintiffs. 
(R. 8384, pp. 123-125.) As noted above, the court directed a verdict in favor of 
Code at the end of the plaintiffs' case in chief; consequently, Schvaneveldt was the 
only remaining option for the jury. See p. 11, supra. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed legal error in this case in a number of respects. As 
a threshold issue, the trial court erred in not dismissing this action and striking the 
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judgment because the Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue the Defendants for 
recovery of a real estate commission under the FSBO agreement. Utah statutory 
law is clear that only a principal broker can seek recovery in the courts for a real 
(;iJ estate commission. The dba ReMax Elite is identified as the brokerage company 
party to the FSBO. The undisputed evidence shows that none of the Plaintiffs were 
the principal broker of dba ReMax Elite when the FSBO was executed and none of 
the Plaintiffs ever became the principal broker of dba ReMax Elite. Rather, dba 
ReMax Elite was established, registered and owned by Dale Quinlan, a former 
principal broker. Mr. Quinlan has not sued the Defendants and, subsequent to the 
verdict, Mr. Quinlan assigned all of his interest and the interest of dba ReMax Elite 
in the FSBO agreement to Still Standing Stables, L.C. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs, 
never being the principal broker for dba Re Max Elite, lack standing under Utah 
law to sue the Defendants under the FSBO and cannot cure that standing defect. 
Additionally, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and talcing 
from the jury the determination of whether a real estate commission was due and 
owing to the Plaintiffs under the FSBO. The court ruled that the Plaintiffs had 
done everything they were required to do and were entitled to a commission under 
the FSBO regardless of whether the sale fell through due to default of the Buyer or 
the Seller. 
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The court's ruling is wrong because, first and foremost, it overlooks the 
plain language of the FSBO. The plain language of the FSBO provides for 
payment of the commission from the proceeds of the sale and if the sale falls 
through, ReMax Elite is only entitled to a commission if the sale is "prevented due 
to default of seller." That language is in direct contravention with Plaintiffs' claim 
and the trial court's finding that it was irrelevant whether the sale was prevented by 
default of the Buyer or the Seller. 
Furthermore, the court's ruling that the Plaintiffs were entitled to a 
commission as a matter of law is wrong because: 1) the Plaintiffs did not prove that 
the Sellers defaulted in any way and the court later ruled that the Buyers had 
waived any objections to the property access issue; and 2) the court incorrectly 
conflated the legal principals of "insurable access" and "good and marketable title" 
to find that the Seller breached the obligation to convey good and marketable title. 
The court's grant of summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs' right to a real 
estate commission is also wrong based an alternative standard that the Plaintiffs 
had produced a "ready, willing, able and accepted" buyer. The record shows that 
issues of fact exist regarding whether the Plaintiffs produced a "ready, willing, able 
and accepted" buyer. 
Lastly, the trial court erred in denying the Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment to dismiss claims against Schvaneveldt in his individual capacity, and 
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conversely ruling as a matter of law that any liability of Schvaneveldt for the real 
estate commission was in his individual capacity rather than as a member of 
Standing Still, LLC. The law and facts clearly demonstrate that any liability of 
~ Schvaneveldt for the real estate commission is, as a matter of law, as a member of 
and in his representative capacity of Standing Still, LLC, the owner of the property 
._;;; being offered for purchase. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION. 
Whether a party has standing to bring or maintain an action is a matter of the 
court's jurisdiction. The party pursuing the claim bears the burden of establishing 
standing. Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1167, 1171 
(Utah 1986). 
In this case, the plaintiffs cannot establish standing for two independent 
reasons: First, by statute the Plaintiffs lacked standing in the court below. Second, 
..;; the claimholder and associated rights have now been acquired by one of the 
defendants, Still Standing Stables, who does not wish to continue the action. 
A. The Plaintiffs lacked standing in the court below. 
Utah statutes impose specific restrictions on who may bring an action 
seeking a real estate commission. Under Utah law, only a "principal broker" can 
contract for, and later seek in the courts, a real estate commission: 
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No sales agent or associate broker may sue in is own name for the 
recovery of a fee commission or compensation for services as sales 
agent or associate broker unless the action is against the principal 
broker with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the recovery 
of a fee, commission or other compensation may only be instituted 
and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales agent or 
associate broker is affiliated. 
U.C.A § 61-2-18 (now Utah Code§ 61-2f-305).9 
The purpose of this brokerage provision is to closely regulate the real estate 
industry to protect the public. Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development 
Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1980); 12 AmJur 2d Brokers § 8. Consistent with the· 
statute, Utah courts deny nonbrokers statutory standing to sue for commissions. 
See, e.g., Diversified Gen. Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, 584 P.2d 848 (Utah 
1978). Likewise, the trial court barred one of the original plaintiffs, Tim Shea, 
from suing for a commission under this statute. (R. 1885.) 
Because only a principal broker can collect a real estate commission in Utah, 
the number of persons who can bring such actions is small. Apart from this unique 
privilege of suing to collect commissions, a broker is free to conduct business as he 
9 The Utah statutory scheme in place at the time of the REPC and FSBO 
contemplated a "principal broker" as the person who engages in the selling or 
listing for sale real estate for commission. A principal broker must be licensed by 
the state. Utah Code § 61-2-1 (2006). An associate broker is an independent 
contractor engaged by the principal broker. Utah Code § 61-2-2 (2006). A 
brokerage is the business activity (or office) of the broker, whether it be in the 
form of an entity or collection of entities and independent contractors that is 
supervised by the broker. 
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or she sees fit under the various options provided for by law, for example, as a 
corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership, or the like. A common 
tool used by business entities to enhance their brand and to make doing business 
easier is an assumed name. 
State statutes allow persons and entities to do business under assumed 
~ names, commonly known as a "doing business as" or "dba" names. However, the 
legislature also requires central registration of dbas to provide notice to the world 
that someone or something is acting under a fictitious identity. See generally Utah 
Code§ 42-2-5, et seq. 
By statute, any person or entity who fails to properly register a dba is barred 
from bringing or maintaining an action: 
any person who carries on, conduct, or transacts business under an 
assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this 
chapter, and until the provisions of this chapter complied with: (1) 
shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, 
cross-complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of this state .... 
Utah Code § 42-2-10. 
Often, this defect can be cured through proper registration while the action is 
pending. See, e.g., Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy 
Recovery Special Serv. Dist., 1999 UT App 136, ,r,r 15-16, 979 P.2d 363 (allowing 
amendment of pleadings after failure to register dba was cured). In this case, 
however, there was no cure and, as discussed below, there can never be one. 
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As noted above, the action was commenced by a dba, ReMax Elite. The 
FSBO itself was also in the name of "ReMax Elite dba." See pp. 16-1 7 supra 
(Add.Exh.5, p. 1 § 1.) ReMax Elite was originally registered by a principal broker, 
Dale Quinlan, on December 28, 2004. (R. 6904, 6922.) Quinlan owned the dba 
ReMax Elite from the time he registered it in 2004 until it expired in January 2008. 
(R. 1702-03, 8044.) Normally, there would be nothing particularly noteworthy 
about a principal broker utilizing a dba. Here, however, Quinlan ceased 
functioning as a principal broker in late 2005. (R. 7305, 7353.) Skip Wing came 
in as a successor principal broker for the group of individuals and entities that 
comprised his brokerage. Id. Significantly, however, Wing was never assigned 
any interest in the ReMax Elite dba, which Quinlan continued to own. See pp. 11-
12, supra. 
Thus, at the time of the transaction concerning Schvaneveldt (both the 
execution of the FSBO and the REPC), Skip Wing was functioning as a principal 
broker - but not for the entity named on the two contracts (ReMax Elite). The only 
individual signing the two documents was the agent Tim Shea, who was incapable 
of binding the owner of the dba, since he was not acting on behalf of that owner 
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(Quinlan) and was not in any event able to act in any capacity on behalf of 
Quinlan, who was no longer acting as a principal broker. 10 
This disconnect between the ReMax Elite dba and a principal broker is 
dispositive. Only a principal broker can contract for and seek a commission under 
Section 61-2-18; accordingly, for a dba to do the same, it must be a properly 
~ registered dba of a principal broker, as provided in Section 42-2-5, et seq. In short, 
the principal broker statute significantly narrows the class of individuals who 
might seek a real estate commission. The dba statute narrows that class even 
further, in this case, down to one person: Dale Quinlan. 
Schvaneveldt raised standing concerns early on in the litigation, putting the 
appellees on notice that the dba was not a proper party plaintiff. (E.g., R. 601 
(filed June 23, 2008).) The dba's lack of standing later became the gravamen of a 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 1702-03.) 
There is ample evidence that Wing or the other plaintiffs realized that the 
ij dba under which they were purporting to sue was never registered to Wing, and the 
ramifications thereof. Wing filed a declaration stating that, in the spring of 2006, 
. .;J Quinlan had approached the other owners of his company, Aspenwood Real Estate 
10 There are instances when naming individually the owners of a dba may cure a 
defective dba registration. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 
901, 905-06 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner 636 P.2d 1060, 
1062 (Utah 1981). That, however, did not occur here. Quinlan was never named as 
a party. Even if he had been, it would have cured nothing, when he was not a 
principal broker at the time of the transaction. 
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Corporation, and had transferred the ReMax Elite dba to Aspenwood. (R. 7495, ,r,r 
7-12.) However, after an investigation, the State of Utah determined that the 
documents purporting to transfer the dba from Quinlan to Aspenwood were 
forgeries, and that ownership of the dba had never been transferred. (R. 7318, 
7332-7350, 8146.) The Plaintiffs did not appeal or otherwise challenge the State's 
ruling. Record, passim. 
In short, no party with standing brought this action. The plaintiff ReMax 
Elite dba was owned by Dale Quinlan, who never sued under the contract, and who 
is not a party to either the FSBO or the REPC. At the time the claim for a 
commission was first made in this action, the dba had expired. While this defect 
might have been curable, that never happened. Even joinder of additional parties 
(such as Wing) later on did not cure the dba's inability to sue, since (1) the dba was 
expired, and (2) none of the added plaintiffs owned the dba anyway. 
B-. The Plaintiffs cannot cure the standing defect or show standing on 
appeal because one of the defendants, Still Standing Stables, has 
now acquired both the ReMax Elite dba and all rights of its 
former owner, Dale Quinlan. 
After the verdict was entered in this case, Quinlan assigned all of his interest 
and the interest of his dba, ReMax Elite, in the FSBO agreement to Still Standing 
Stables. (R. 813 8.) Quinlan also settled with the defendants all disputes regarding 
the FSBO, both personally and on behalf of the dba that he owned when the 
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contracts at issue were signed. (R. 8126, 8142.) Additionally, in 2014, Still 
Standing Stables registered the available ReMax Elite dba. (R. 8199, p. 3 ,r B.) 
Through these events, Still Standing Stables now is the only entity with the 
standing to pursue ReMax Elite's commission claim against itself and 
Schvaneveldt. This Court has recognized that such an assignment, and, a fortiori, 
~ disposition of a cause of action, can occur. Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond 
Holdings, 2013 UT App 32,296 P.3d 780. Such a transfer of rights "cuts off the 
former plaintiffs right to pursue" judgment. Id., ,r 22. With the registration of the 
ReMax Elite dba, and assignment of the former owner's rights and other choses in 
action, Still Standing Stables now has the right to cut off permanently any further 
proceedings relating to the judgment. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs lack standing to 
maintain this action against the Defendants. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING FROM THE JURY THE 
QUESTION OF WHETHER A COMMISSION HAD BEEN EARNED. 
A. The Plaintiffs were required to show seller default under the 
FSBO. 
As noted, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing 
entitlement to a commission as a matter of law. (R. 1508 (motion to have court 
rule that "ReMax Elite performed its duties pursuant to the For Sale By Owner 
Commission Agreement & Agency Disclosure such that ReMax Elite should be 
paid a commission.").) 
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The Plaintiffs argued that this case was governed by Fairbourn Commercial, 
Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, 94 P.3d 292, and 
Schvaneveldt agrees. In Fairbourn, the Utah Supreme Court applied some 
governing legal principles. First, as a general or default principle, "a real estate 
broker is entitled to its commission when it has procured a buyer who is 'ready, 
willing and able and who is accepted by the seller."' 2004 UT 54, ,r 7. Under this 
standard, the underlying real estate transaction need not be consummated because 
"absent a contractual provision conditioning a broker's commission on a buyer's 
performance, 'the broker is not an insurer of the subsequent performance of the 
contract."' Id. 
"The default ready, willing, and able rule may, however, by avoided by 
agreement." 2004 UT 54, ,r 8. In Fairbourn, the parties had done so, using 
language that eliminated any requirement that the specified buyer actually be able 
to purchase the property, and instead allowing a commission if any offer was 
"procure[d]" from the buyer. Id., ,r,r 8-9.11 
In light of the parties' wording choice, Fairbourn concluded, a statement 
later in the contract that the commission was "due and payable upon closing" could 
11 The comm1ss1on agreement in F airbourn read, "If F airboum procures, or 
presents an offer to purchase said property from Rochelle, at the price and upon the 
terms and conditions set forth herein, or at any other price or upon any other terms 
or conditions acceptable to me, I agree to pay a commission equal to $1,500.00 per 
lot." Id., ,r 8 (court's ellipse and brackets omitted). 
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not have been intended to impose a condition that the sale actually close. To read 
it otherwise would negate the parties' modified language requiring only that the 
broker "procure or present an offer from Rochelle". 2004 UT 54, ,r 11. The due 
and payable provision in that contract was required to be read "in relation to all of 
the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Id., ,r 10. 
In this case, ReMax initially argued that it was entitled to a commission 
regardless of whether the sale fell through due to a default of Buyers or a default of 
Seller. Thus, the Plaintiffs said, the court need not decide, whether Seller had 
defaulted. See R. 1520-1522 ("Default by the Seller or Buyer is irrelevant to 
earning the commission .... Any fault or blame for the eventual failure to close is 
irrelevant to whether ReMax brought a ready, willing, and able buyer to the table .. 
. . Any subsequent problems with the closing and sale are irrelevant regardless of 
fault.... While ReMax would contend that the Seller breached, and therefore the 
commission is due and owing, such an argument is really irrelevant to deciding 
~ whether the commission is due and payable because the closing date has passed, 
and according to the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Fairbourn, that is all that is 
necessary."). 
By the time their motion was argued, the Plaintiffs had refined their earlier 
argument, and were now acknowledging that, under Fairbourn, the court needed to 
find a default of the seller. The Plaintiffs argued (correctly) that, under the 
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wording of the FSBO itself, the correct standard was not a general "ready, willing, 
able, and accepted" standard, but rather seller default: 
[Schvaneveldt's trial counsel] is trying to argue that Fairbourn stands 
for the proposition that we have to find a ready, willing and able buyer, that 
the seller accepts and I disagree, respectfully, your Honor. 
I think that the F airbourn case stands for the proposition that, you 
know, they're citing the general rule and then saying, here's why the general 
rule doesn't apply and that's how Fairbourn applies to this case. And so, 
you know, in looking at Fairbourn, what we think the Court can do is say, I 
don't even have to think about ready, willing and able, all I have to do is 
look at this document and say, did they find a buyer that the seller accepted 
and did they default? And if that's the conclusion that the Court comes to, 
then the Court can say there's a commission due and payable by somebody, 
we don't - the Court still has to rule on that as a matter of law, but 
somebody owes a commission. 
(R. 8382, p. 53.) 
The Plaintiffs' interpretation of Fairbourn was correct, and is dispositive not 
only of this appeal but of all claims against Schvaneveldt as a matter of law. 
Under the plain language of the FSBO, because the sale did not go through (and 
therefore there were no proceeds of the seller from which to pay a commission and 
no recordation of closing documents), Plaintiffs could claim a commission only if 
the sale was "prevented due to default of seller." But the trial court ruled as a 
matter of law - and the Plaintiffs did not appeal - that it was Buyers who defaulted, 
not the seller. 
As Fairbourn directs, whether a commission was payable starts with the 
wording of the FSBO. Unlike the agreement in Fairbourn, the FSBO here 
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expressly included language contemplating that a sale would have to be completed 
for a commission to be payable. The relevant language states: 
2. BROKERAGE FEE. The Seller agrees to pay the Company, 
irrespective of agency relationship( s ), s compensation for services, a 
Brokerage Fee in the amount of$ __ or 3% of the acquisition price of the 
Property, if the Seller accepts an offer from Emmett Warren and or Assigns 
(the "Buyer"), or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf, to purchase or 
exchange the Property. The Seller agrees that the Brokerage Fee shall be 
due and payable, from the proceeds of the Seller, on the date of recording of 
closing documents for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the 
Buyer or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf. If the sale or exchange is 
prevented by default of the Seller, the Brokerage Fee shall immediately be 
due and payable to the Company. 
(Add.Exh. 5, § 2.) 
Within the Brokerage Fee provision itself, ReMax Elite agreed that its 
payment would be from "the proceeds of the seller." If there were no proceeds- if 
the sale fell through - then no payment was due and payable. Similarly, if there 
was no "recording of closing documents for the purchase ... by the Buyer or anyone 
acting on the Buyer's behalf," then no payment was due and payable. 
The parties agreed to one exception to this provision: "If the sale or 
exchange is prevented by default of the Seller, the Brokerage Fee shall immediately 
be due and payable to the Company." Under this language, if the Plaintiffs could 
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show that 1) the Seller defaulted, and 2) the sale was prevented because of this 
default, then it could seek a commission. 12 
B. There was no basis upon which the trial court could find "default 
of the seller" as a matter of law. 
Although the Plaintiffs did not address seller default in their moving papers, 
a number of the parties' motions overlapped, incorporated each other, or were 
argued simultaneously. The Plaintiffs might therefore contend that one of the trial 
court's rulings on another motion amounted to a finding of seller default. In 
response to a motion for summary judgment filed by Tim Shea, the agent, against 
Still Standing Stables, the trial court found as a matter of law that the sale fell 
through because the seller could not guarantee "insurable" access. The trial court 
later stated that this ruling was law of the case as to all parties. See p. 28, supra. 13 
12 The Plaintiffs' moving papers did not attempt to establish seller default. 
Summary judgment was thus inappropriate on the face of the Plaintiffs' motion. 
See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 10, 177 P.3d 600 (moving party must make 
initial showing that he is entitled to judgment and that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact that would preclude summary judgment in his favor); Frisbee v. K & 
K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984) (summary judgment is inappropriate if 
moving papers fail to establish the absence of fact issues; summary judgment 
reversed where document relied on by moving party showed ambiguity on its face 
even though non-moving party failed to respond). 
13 The court did not rule that there was no access to the property. The court held 
that, regardless of potential issues of fact as to access, "this case has never been 
about whether access actually existed; rather it is about Still Standing's undisputed 
inability to obtain insurance on an access to the property." (R. 5049-50 (emphasis 
in original).) 
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For two independent reasons, this ruling did not - and could not - establish 
"default of the Seller" as a matter of law. First, as the court later ruled, Buyers had 
waived any objections to the access issue, and had assented to purchase the 
4i> property in its present condition. See pp. 27 and 28, supra. Therefore, as a matter 
of law, it was Buyers who defaulted when they failed to show up at the closing. 
The trial court certainly could not rule otherwise as a matter of law. See 
Cooper Enterprises v. Brighton Title Co., LLC, 2010 UT App 135, ,r 16, 233 P.3d 
548 (buyer was not entitled to return of earnest money where it knew of questions 
regarding owner's title before the due diligence deadline but did not cancel). That 
is particularly true when the FSBO itself - the commission agreement upon which 
the Plaintiffs rely - incorporated the Seller's disclosures regarding access, to which 
the court found the Buyers had assented. 
Additionally, the trial court conflate~ "insurable access" and "good and 
marketable title." Both the FSBO and the REPC require a Seller to transfer 
"marketable" or "good and marketable" title. See Add.Exh. 5 (FSBO) § 4 and 
Add.Exh. 6 (REPC) § 10.1. Plaintiffs argued, and the trial court accepted, that a 
buyer's inability to find insurance that will include guaranteed access means that 
the seller failed to deliver "good and marketable title" as a matter of law. That is 
not consistent with Utah law. 
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Allegedly landlocked property can be and is sold all the time. As Plaintiffs 
themselves pointed out, Still Standing Stables had purchased this very land without 
a guarantee of access. The Utah Supreme Court has defined "marketable title" as 
"one that may be 'freely made the subject of resale' and that can be sold at a 'fair 
price to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as 
security for the loan money."' Booth v. Attorneys ' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc., 2001 
UT 13, il 33, 20 P.3d 319, quoting Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 
1243 (Utah 1992). 
The trial court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, a buyer's inability to 
obtain insurance that includes access means that the seller breached an obligation 
to convey good and marketable title. In fact, this Court has rejected that very 
contention. In Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), a buyer 
sought rescission of a real estate purchase by arguing, among other things, that 
the lack of legal access to the property precluded the Jacksons [sellers] from 
conveying marketable title. Furthermore, the Mostrongs [buyers] argue that 
their exposure to litigation, in attempting to obtain legal access to the 
property, is evidence of the property's unmarketable title. They assert that 
the Jacksons failed and refused to cure this breach of contract. In addition, 
they claim they were unable to finance the property because it was 
"landlocked." 
Id. at 577. 
Those circumstances did not mean that, as a matter of law, the sellers failed 
to offer good and marketable title, this Court held. Id. at 578, citing Sinks v. 
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Karleskint, 130 Ill.App.3d 527, 85 Ill.Dec. 807, 810, 474 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1985) 
( court noting that access problems do not impair the right to possess property and 
that only defects related to title as guaranteed to the purchaser and affecting market 
value will render title unmarketable); see 11 Couch on Insurance § l 5959 Access 
to Parcel Insured ( ability to access parcel of real estate is not technically a defect in 
..;; the title to the property). 
··-.dJ 
"The Mostrongs failed to establish either factually or as a matter of law that 
marketable title in this instance necessarily included legal access to the property," 
the court stated. Mostrong, 866 P.2d at 578. Among other things, they adduced no 
evidence that the alleged lack of access affected the market value of the property. 
Additionally, the seller was entitled to undertake reasonable efforts to cure defects. 
Id.14 
C. If the Plaintiffs only had to show that it produced a "ready 
willing, able, and accepted" buyer, issues of fact existed on those 
elements. 
14 Actual access would, of course, preclude any argument that good and marketable 
title could not be conveyed in this case. Accordingly, the fact that the trial court 
declined to rule on whether access in fact existed, and instead focused only on 
insured access, meant that the court could not rule on "good and marketable title" 
as a matter of law. See, e.g., Mostrong, 866 P.2d at 579, citing Brown v. Yacht 
Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Idaho App. 
1989) ("Insurable title merely means that property is capable of being insured, not 
that the title is good or marketable.") and Holmby, Inc. v. Dino, 98 Nev. 358, 647 
P.2d 392, 394 (1982) (noting that insurance may be "evidence'" of marketable 
title). 
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As the Plaintiffs themselves argued, a general "ready, willing, able, and 
accepted" standard did not apply in this case. Even under that standard, however, 
the trial court could not properly grant summary judgment. 
Were the Buyers ready? That is unclear. The Plaintiffs claimed that a hard 
money lender had agreed to finance $3,580,000 of the purchase price, and that 
another individual named Mark Bosco was providing the remaining $782,500 of 
the purchase price. (R. 1516.) But no affidavit or other testimony from Mr. Bosco 
was adduced. (R. 1548-49.) Under Orvis, supra, the lack of such affirmative 
evidence precluded summary judgment. 
Were Buyers able? Buyers said they were unable to obtain financing 
because of a condition ( alleged lack of insurable access) that Buyers waived. (R. 
1554.) If anything, this establishes that they were not able. 
Were Buyers willing? No; they waived all objections yet did not show up. 
(See R. 1630 (Buyers unwilling).) 
Were Buyers accepted by Seller? That one is a bit more complicated. Shea 
admits that, when meeting with Schvaneveldt, he (Shea) represented that this 
would be a "cash" transaction. (R. 3268, p. 22.) Schvaneveldt thought that was 
why the space next to "loan" was left blank. See p. 19, supra. 
Plaintiffs successfully argued, however, that Schvaneveldt could not dispute 
acceptance on this ground because a box containing the word "Conventional" 
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under New Loan was marked with an X. (R. 3421; seep. 23, supra.) As a matter 
of law, it was immaterial that the space for the loan amount was left blank, the 
Plaintiffs argued. But there was evidence to the contrary, including the fact that, 
after Schvaneveldt signed the original REPC, Shea went back and hand wrote 
"TBD" in the blank. Shea himself admitted that, to him, "TBD" could mean either 
\IP cash or a conventional loan. (R. 3274, pp. 149-150:21-1 (TBD meant "We put 
conventional but they had the right to determine whether it was cash, 
conventional.").) 
Plaintiffs argued, and the court ruled:, that Shea's alterations were 
meaningless, that Shea just made them for "internal" purposes. (R. 8384, p. 72:9-
14.) There was no difference at all between a blank space and TBD, Plaintiffs 
said; TBD was "equivalent to" a blank space. (R. 3436.) 
That suggestion seems perplexing on its face. If TBD literally made no 
difference at all, and was exactly the same as a blank space, then why did Shea add 
~ it? If a blank space could only mean one thing (non-cash transaction), then why go 
back and state that the amount of the loan was To Be Determined? What was there 
that needed to be determined? 
Whether a transaction is cash or financed is material, particularly given the 
greater restrictive lending practices that may come into play with a financed 
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purchase. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in ruling as a 
matter of law that Buyers were "accepted" by Schvaneveldt. 15 
In sum, issues of fact existed as to whether the Plaintiffs produced a buyer 
who was ready, willing, able, and accepted by the seller, and summary judgment 
was inappropriate. 
Ill. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT ANY LIABILITY OF SCHVANEVELDT WAS IN HIS 
PERSONAL CAPACITY. 
A. The facts and law show that Schvaneveldt was acting as a member 
of the LLC. 
By statute and Utah Supreme Court precedent, the trial court erred in ruling 
as a matter of law that any liability of Schvaneveldt for the commission was in his 
personal capacity. The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act provides that 
no member of a limited liability company is personally liable for an obligation of 
the company. Utah Code § 48-2c-601 ("[N]o organizer, member, manager, or 
employee of a company is personally liable under a judgment, decree, or order of a 
court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company or 
for the acts or omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of the company."). 
15 The fact that Shea's other modifications were unmistakably material - for 
example, identifying himself for the first time as an agent for the Seller as well as 
the Buyer - suggests materiality to this change as well. See p. 18, supra. 
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Applying this clear statute, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an 
individual member of an LLC is "personally liable for a signed contract only if he 
executed the contract 'in a manner clearly indicating that the liability was his 
alone."' Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ,r 40, 190 P.3d 1269 (quotation omitted). 
In Daines, the court held that a signing party was not liable in his individual 
~ capacity because the language of the contract and surrounding circumstances 
evidenced that he was executing the contract on behalf of the LLC rather than in a 
personal capacity, and the contract did not "clearly indicate" the liability was an 
individual one of the signor. Id. 
For example, the contract in Daines included the name of the LLC, and 
prefatory documents executed in relation to the contract made it "apparent that 
Daines recognized that he would be dealing with [the LLC] ASC through Vincent 
and not with Vincent in his individual capacity." Id. at ,r 41. The conclusion that 
the signor was acting in his capacity as a member of the LLC rather than 
..;J individually was also supported by the other side's deposition testimony wherein 
he testified to "his continued understanding that Vincent was acting on behalf of 
ASC[.]" Id; see also, Krogh v. Nielsen, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175087, 9 (D. 
Utah Dec. 10, 2012) (dismissing claims against individual corporate officers 
because "a corporate officer[] is not personally liable under contract unless 'he 
51 
executed the contract in a manner clearly indicating that the liability was his 
alone."'). 
The same is true in this case. It was Shea - Buyers' own agent - who 
identified "Land LLC Still Standing Stables" when defining the Property in the 
initial offer. (Add.Exh. 6 at tjf 1). Two days after the offer was accepted, Shea 
filled out a Seller's Disclosure form that identified the property owner as Still 
Standing Stables, LLC. (R. 2952.) The REPC stated, "If ... Seller is a corporation, 
partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company or othe~ entity, the person 
executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to 
bind ... Seller." (Add.Exh. 6 at~ 13). And under the LLC act, "any member in a 
member-managed company, ... may sign, acknowledge, and deliver any document 
transferring or affecting the company's interest in real or personal property." Utah 
Code § 48-2c-802. 
Other evidence abounds in the record that Schvaneveldt was acting on behalf 
of the LLC - and that everyone knew it. When ReMax Elite filed the initial 
interpleader action to resolve entitlement to the earnest money deposit, it sued only 
Still Standing Stables, not Schvaneveldt. (R. l.) Documents filed by Plaintiffs 
themselves included records showing that title insurers only searched for liens and 
judgments against Still Standing Stables, not Schvaneveldt individually (R. 2977, 
2996), that Buyers directed correspondence to "Still Standing Stables, Attn: Chuck 
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Schvaneveldt" (R. 393), and that Skip Wing directed correspondence to "Chuck 
Schvaneveldt, Still Standing Stables," at its Directors Row address that is also 
listed on the REPC. (R. 21; Add.Exh. 6.) 
Additionally, if, as Schvaneveldt testified - and, frankly, seems obvious 
from the face of the document - another word ("Member") originally followed his 
\.@ signature on the REPC, that is further evidence of representative capacity. Even 
absent such testimony, however, the Plaintiffs did not adduce "clear" evidence that 
Schvaneveldt was signing in his personal capacity. The trial court erred in denying 
Schvaneveldt' s motion for summary judgment on this ground. 16 
B. Alternatively, Schvaneveldt's tort claims against Shea and Wing 
should be reinstated. 
As argued above, Schvaneveldt is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If 
the Court does not so rule, however, then Schvaneveldt's tort claims against Shea 
and Wing should be reinstated on remand. The trial court declined to allow 
Schvaneveldt to pursue negligence or misrepresentation claims against Shea and 
Wing because it had ruled as a matter of law that the sale fell through due to a lack 
of insurable access. See p. 28, supra. In light of the court's later ruling that this 
16 The Plaintiffs complained that, after the denial of his motion for summary 
judgment based on the lack of personal liability, Schvaneveldt then asserted an 
alternative argument, i.e., that he lacked authority to bind the LLC and therefore 
closure of the sale was an impossibility. But parties are allowed to argue in the 
alternative, and particularly when their initial (correct) argument has been 
successfully opposed. 
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access issue had been waived by Buyers (seep. 27, supra), that ruling is no longer 
supportable. 
Claims against Shea and Wing should also be allowed because their alleged 
breaches of duty caused Schvaneveldt concrete harm, not the least of which was 
getting Schvaneveldt sued. Although Shea contended that his principal duties were 
owed to Buyers, he undisputedly owed some duties to Seller, for whom he also 
claimed to be acting. Seep. 18 supra; Cooper Enter. PC v. Brighton Title Co., 
LLC, 2010 UT App 135, ,r 12 n.5, 233 P.3d 548; Gilbert Dev. Corp. v. Wardley 
Corp, 2010 UT App. 361, ,r 23, 246 P.3d 131. That is especially true when Shea 
undertook affirmative actions upon which Schvaneveldt relied to his detriment, at 
which point he was required to perform those acts in a non-negligent manner. 
Robinson v. Mt. Logan Clinic, 2008 UT 21, 182 P.3d 333. As the alleged principal 
broker, Skip Wing is vicariously liable for Shea's actions. 
The record supports several examples of actionable conduct. For example, 
Shea knew that the property was owned by an LLC. See p. 51 supra (Add.Exh. 6 
at ,r 1 ). Yet evidence exists that, at some point before the commencement of 
litigation, Shea altered the word "Member" that Schvaneveldt had written beside 
his name on the REPC. Seep. 19-20, supra. The inclusion of that word alone 
would have prevented these claims against Schvaneveldt individually. 
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Shea also admits that he (mis)represented to Schvaneveldt that this was a 
cash transaction, and then drafted an ambiguous REPC that did not contradict that 
representation. See p. 19, supra. Because of those actions, Schvaneveldt signed 
the REPC - which, again, got him sued. Shea prepared the Seller's disclosures that 
the Plaintiffs in this case later claimed were incorrect and had caused the sale to 
viJ fall through. Schvaneveldt' s recoverable damages include the attorney fees 
incurred in defending the claims against himself caused by . Shea's acts. See 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 535 (Utah 1993) (recognizing 
third party tort rule). 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
The FSBO has an attorney fee provision (the same provision cited by the 
Plaintiffs when they received an award of attorney (ees against Schvaneveldt). 
Add.Exh. 5 § 8. As noted above, Plaintiffs failed to adduce clear evidence that 
Schvaneveldt signed in his personal capacity; accordingly, this Court should 
remand with instructions to enter judgment for Schvaneveldt. In that event, or if 
the Court remands for other purposes, it should provide that, should Schvaneveldt 
prevail on remand, he is entitled to attorney fees incurred in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant Schvaneveldt respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the judgment and instruct the trial court to enter 
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judgment in favor of Schvaneveldt as a matter of law. Alternatively, the Court 
should reverse the judgment and remand the case for trial. 
INCORPORATION 
Pursuant to U .R.A.P. 24{i ), Schvaneveldt adopts by reference arguments by 
Still Standing Stables, LLC ( which has not yet been filed) which also relate to the 
liability of Schvaneveldt and coextensive claims. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 2015. 
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1 lifted, the lis pendens, the land sold virtually immediately 
2 
3 
4 
thereafter--
MR. WALLACE : 
MR. FULLER: 
That was all settled--
--immediately thereafter, about--about 
5 90 days, they were able to sell that exact piece of land for 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the million dollars. 
So that's all, your Honor. 
me get all those points in. Thank you. 
THE COURT: You're welcome. 
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your preparation 
and your argument this morning. 
The Court finds and rules as follows: The Court 
grants Remax•s motion for summary judgment and denies Still 
Standing's cross-motion. 
This is how I see this case. These motions can be 
boiled down to one simple issue, the lack of a guaranteed 
access to the property. Despite several attempts by various 
title insurers and attorneys, no one could guarantee the 
access to the property existed. Still standing attempts to 
argue that there was a valid access by way of an easement. 
While I'm personally doubtful of the legal efficacy of that 
easement to achieve what you argued, Mr. Fuller, the bottom 
line is, I think it•s irrelevant because on one could 
guarantee the access to the buyer. 
Both the buyer and the seller were well aware of 
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1 this fact and the Court finds that there is undisputed--or 
2 that it is undisputed that the lack of a guaranteed access was 
3 the sole reason for the--that the transaction failed. 
4 I mean, it strains credulity to think that somebody 
5 would fork over over four million without a general warranty 
6 deed or at least some kind of a guarantee under a special 
7 warranty deed that there would be an access. 
8 Still Standing argues that if Shea had made certain 
9 disclosures to it, then it could have prevented the 
10 transaction's failure. It is my judgment, based on what I 
11 have read, that that is not accurate. Still Standing was 
12 aware of the access problems from the time it purchased the 
13 property and had tried many different avenues to guarantee an 
14 access to the property, all of which failed. 
15 Shea's failure to communicate or disclose 
16 information to Still Standing did not cause the transaction to~ 
.i 
·I 
17 fail. i 
18 Still Standing raises many other issues, including 
19 agency duties, disclosures and royalties in an attempt to 
20 prevent summary judgment. While there are undoubtedly. factual 
21 issues that exist, none of these issues is relevant because 
22 · Still Standing cannot show that they were damaged by anything 
23 other than the inability to guarantee an access. 
24 Even if Shea and Remax acted improperly in some way 
25 as Still Standing suggests, the simple truth is that the 
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actions of Shea and Rernax did not cause the transaction to 
fail; therefore, Still Standing cannot prove that they were 
damaged in any way by the actions of Shea or Remax. 
As a result, even if Shea did not fulfill some duty 
owed to Still Standing or even if Shea made some 
misrepresentation to Still Standing, all of Still Standing's 
claims fail because it cannot prove that Shea and Remax caused 
any damage to Still Standing. The transaction failed because 
Still Standing could not guarantee an access to the property. 
That's the bo"ttom line. 
Accordingly, again, the Court grants the--Remax•s 
motion for summary judgment, dismisses Still Standing's 
affirmative claims. 
~r. Wallace, would you please prepare an appropriate 
order consistent with this ruling? 
MR. WALLACE: I will do so, your Honor. Thank you 
for your time. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. FULLER: Your Honor, could I--is there a way--
that chart I had there, can I fold that up and put it as part 
of the record? Is there a way to accommodate the chart? 
THE COURT: Which one? Yours? 
MR. FULLER: Yeah. My--it'll fold right up, your 
Honor, I--
THE COURT: Oh, sure. 
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broker and therefore, it's immaterial whether Mr. Wing was--
was consulted or involved in this case, so that's it. 
And we're going to try this issue. 'w 
I need just a minute to clear my head. I don't know 
whether I can grant something here this morning or not. I'm 
really tempted, but let me finish with this young lady so she 
can go. 
(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: All right, gentlemen. Let me give you a 
ruling on Remax•s motion for partial summary judgment. The 
Court grants Remax•s motion for partial summary judgment 
subject to the jury's factual determination as to the offer 
date contained in the REPC. In doing so, the Court finds and 
rules as follows: 
The Court finds no genuine issue of material fact 
exists regarding whether plaintiff's earned the commission. 
The FBSO contract provided that, and for the record, that's 
the for sale by owner contract, provided that seller would owe 
Remax a three percent commission, and I'm quoting, if the 
seller accepts an offer from Emmett Warren and/or assigns or 
anyone acting on behalf--acting on the buyer's behalf to 
purchase the exchange--or exchange the property, end of quote. 
It is undisputed that seller did accept an offer from Emmett 
Warren LC; therefore, Remax earned the three percent 
commission. 
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The failure of the buyer to close or actually 
purchase the property is irrelevant to the commission. Given 
the language of the contract as well as case law regarding the 
requirement to produce a ready, willing and able buyer. There 
is no genuine issue of fact that Remax presented a ready, 
willing and able buyer. 
The Court has previously ruled that the transaction 
failed because the defendants--because of the defendants• 
inability to insure access to the property, not for a lack of 
funding or any other reason. 
Under Fairbourne, the commission became due and 
payable on the date of closing, regardless of the failure of 
the parties to actually close. The changes Tim Shea made to 
the REPC after the parties signed it are a red herring, in the 
Court's judgment and are irrelevant to the commission claim. 
What is relevant is that the parties agreed to the terms and 
signed the REPC, which triggered the obligation to pay a 
commission. Any changes made after the fact had no influence 
on the buyer and seller's decision to enter into the REPC. 
And that is something I, where you and I just differ~ 
on this issue, Mr. Fuller. 
Allegations of fraud by Tim Shea are equally 
irrelevant to the commission claim. 
Additionally, defendants have not pled a fraud claim 
and therefore, any claims of fraud have been waived. The 
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~ Court will now allow any allegations of fraud to be presented; 
I 
~ 
at trial as such allegations would only distract and confuse ~ 
the jury from the issues at hand. 
Defendants contend that the offer to buy the 
property as contained in the REPC lapsed because it states 
that the offer expires January 23rd, 2006, and the REPC was 
not signed until February 7, 2006. While the Court believes 
this is a mutual mistake of the parties, out of an abundance 
of caution, the Court will allow this factual issue to go to 
the jury. 
Whether Cathy Code acted personally or as an agent 
of Chuck Schvaneveldt in signing the FBSO agreement is an 
issue of fact that is not properly before the Court at this 
time; therefore, the issue must be decided by the jury at 
trial. 
' With regard to defendants' arguments on Remax being~ 
defunct d/b/a impressions of who the principal broker is, the 1 
~ 
·1 
Court has already addressed those issues in prior rulings and 1 
will not address them presently. 
Now, with respect to the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on the issue of--of the Still Standing's 
' 
liability, this motion is born out of the defendants' attempt~ 
~ 
to argue both sides of an issue, specifically attempts by 
Still Standing to lay blame on the other defendant and vice 
versa. Defendants cannot have it both ways, but neither can 
,, 
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plaintiffs; therefore, the court is not going to grant summary 
judgment against plaintiff based solely on Mr. Duncan's 
argument made in a prior brief and no other facts. 
Accordingly, the Court denies the defendants' motion as to 
Still Standing's liability. Still Standing's liability is an 
issue for the jury to decide. 
Let me just indicate with respect to any possible 
time that the Court would have. I am not holding a law and 
motion on Thursday between now and the 9th of August. I am 
holding a civil law and motion calendar on the 23rd of July 
and the 3rd of July, but my vacation schedule is such that I 
will have no time to read anything like this, that I'm--I'm 
virtually, for the next two weeks working or on vacation 
throughout the week except just on those Mondays and I can't 
come in off vacation and handle stuff like this. You know, I 
can't do it. 
And there are some judges that may want to just sit 
and listen and shoot from the hip, but I'm just not capable of 
doing that. And I've never done it and I won't start now. So 
I think the issue of liability is just going to have to be 
decided by a jury. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. 
THE COURT: But this issue on whether the commission 
1
, 
is earned is done and you can--I can allow you, Mr. Fuller, to 
explore the factual issues of whether this was a mutual 
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mistake or whether the agreement lapsed and you can go into 
that issue, but I 1 m not going to allow any other--I'm going to 
uphold that--that commission agreement. I think the 
commission was earned. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. So the commission--okay. So the 
commission's earned, so just to--to clarify. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. FULLER: We're on track for a trial here. 
so as far as liability, I don't go back and argue that through 
his acts that he--all that liability stuff is done. 
THE COURT: No. There--the issue of whose liability 
it is for that commission, that--that is an open issue for 
trial. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. 
THE COURT: In other words, that can be Cathy Code, 
Chuck Schvaneveldt or Still Standing's liability. 
MR. FULLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: That issue's open and the--and the 
interpretation of the agreements and you know, I guess the 
issues of statutes of frauds, those--all those arguments--
MR. FULLER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: --in my perspective, all apply to 
liability. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. So would the jury, for example, 
be asked--we're not going to ask is a commission due, 'cause 
1~ 
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the judge has that there's a commission due. 
THE COURT: And what--what I anticipate will be done 
is.that there will be a jury instruction to the jury that, 
that as a matter of law, the Court has ruled that the 
commission was earned. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. 
THE COURT: And the issue before the jury is who 
will pay it. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. That makes sense. 
Now, and your Honor, you talked about this--the deal 
about the lapsed--the lapse. If it's a question a fact, it 
was--
THE COURT: Yeah. And I appreciate that. 
MR. FULLER: Yeah 
THE COURT: That is a defense. If the agreement 
lapsed, then there is no commission earned. 
MR. LeBARON: Understand, your Honor. 
MR. FULLER: And we're saying it's either lapsed--we 
can't say it's lapsed as a matter of law, we're saying--
THE COURT: No. I--as I tried to explore with Mr. 
LeBaron this morning, I--I think that is so fact sensitive 
that I think it would be an error on the Court's part to--I 
mean, I read the arguments of why it appear to be a mutual 
mistake and I thought it sounded reasonable to me, but I think 
that•s fact sensitive and I'm not--I don't want to create an 
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error, so I'm going to be very conservative on that issue--
MR. FULLER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: --and so--and I'll let you decide how 
you want to fashion your jury instruction, but essentially, 
I'm ruling that--that the commission was earned if in fact, 
the agreement had not lapsed. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. If agreement is not--has not--
THE COURT: That's--
MR. LeBARON: Or can otherwise be directed, I 
suppose. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LeBARON: By mutual mistake. 
THE COURT: By mutual mistake. 
MR. FULLER; But the case where it says you can't 
ratify it, wouldn't that be a matter of law, where we'd say 
the Court says you can't ratify it. Are we going to ask the 
jury that says did they--did they ratify it through mutual 
mistake? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. Okay. With the two issues on 
those issues, because that's really the meat of it, the 
liability part, can the--if the parties stipulated or I got a 
funny feeling you're going to reverse your earlier decision 
about the right-of-way and any of the negligence claims. With 
those--with--
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THE COURT: Yeah. I--that decision, again, I 1 m not 
going to re-plow the ground. 
MR. FULLER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: I think I have ruled that that's what 
caused this sale to not close--
MR. FULLER: Yeah. 
THE COURT: --was the absence of a--an insurable 
right-of-way. 
MR. FULLER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And--and that it--
MR. LeBARON: There's no damage. 
THE COURT: And so that's done. And so, as you 
talk, you know, prepare your--your questions and your 
arguments, it is a--a settled issue that property didn't, 
i 
although there was a con--a commission owed, the contract 1~ 
I-; 
! didn't close because there was no insurable interest, but that~ 
didn't affect the entitlement of the agent 1 s entitlement or--
and the broker 1 s entitlement to the commission. 
MR. FULLER: Okay. And your Honor, so, 
hypothetically, if the Court grants--Mr. Wallace says we want 
to make that final and we have this--the real meat of it here, 
the liability, is there a--is there any circumstance--
THE COURT: Let me just tell you that I've looked at 
some of these others and I haven't had time to--
MR. FULLER: Okay. 
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REMAX ELITE, et al., 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 
Defendants, 
SECOND 
OISTRlr:-r ~OURT 
RULINGS AND ORDER 
ON PENDING MOTIONS 
vs. 
STILL STANDING STABLE, L.C., et 
al., 
CaseNo.060906802 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
JUL 17 2012 
Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs ("Remax") filed a motion for rule 54(b) certification. In response, 
Defendants ("Still Standing'1 filed a motion to enter rule 52 findings and a motion to 
reconsider. Remax then filed a motion to dismiss Still Standing's third-party complaint, 
and Still Standing countered by filing a motion to amend its counterclaims. The Court 
addresses each motion in turn. 
I. Remax's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification 
Pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Remme asks the Court 
to certify as a final judgment its summary judgment ruling dismissing Still Standing's 
claims. While the Court initially intended to grant the motion and expressed this 
intention to the parties at oral argwnent on July 12, 2012, after further consideration, the 
Court denies the motion. 
Rule 54(b) provides that "the court may direct the entry of a final judgment" on a 
claim "upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay." Utah R. Civ. 
504? 
,,. . 
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P. 54(b ). Upon review, the Court cannot make such a determination in this case. 
Following the Court's ruling on Remax's motion for partial summary judgment, there are 
very few issues left to be resolved in the case. Trial on the remaining issues is set to 
begin in less than three weeks. To enter final judgment on some claims now would only 
separate the claims while moving up the appeal deadline by less than a month. This 
seems like a needless measure that could also prejudice Still Standing, as it would then be 
required to file an appeal around the same time it is preparing for trial. At this point, the 
more prudent course is to wait the additional month when all claims will be resolved. 
Consequently, the Court denies Remax's rule 54(b) motion. 
II. Still Standing's Motion to Enter Rule 52 Findings 
On March 22, 2012, the Court heard oral arguments on Remax's motion for 
summary judgment on Still Standing's affirmative claims, and Still Standing's cross-
motion for summary judgment on those claims. At the conclusion of the arguments, the 
Court granted Remax's motion and denied Still Standing's motion, stating the Court's 
findings and conclusions in support of those rulings. Counsel for Remmc prepared an 
order based on the Court's oral ruling, and the Court signed and entered it on May 22, 
2012. Still Standing now asks the Court to enter a written statement of the grounds 
supporting its decision. The Court denies the motion. 
Still Standing quotes from Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App 277, 34 
P .3d 234, in support of its motion. In that opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
and remanded a ruling that had granted summary judgment base on "the reasons set forth 
in the City's supporting memorandwn," but did not otherwise explain the reasoning 
behind its decision. Id. at ,r 9. The appeals court held that it was "unable to square the 
5048 
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trial court's ruling with the various arguments asserted in the City's motion." Id. at 110. 
Based on Gabriel, Still Standing asserts that an additional statement from the Court is 
required. 
The present case is distinguishable from Gabriel. In Gabriel, the trial court gave 
no explanation for its reasoning other than the reference to the City's memorandum. In 
our case, although the written order is rather laconic, it does refer to the oral findings and 
conclusions the Court made at the close of oral arguments in which the Court made very 
clear the grounds for granting Remruc's motion and denying Still Standing's. The Court 
stated that its ruling was based on the undisputed fact that the transaction failed because 
Still Standing was unable to guarantee access to the property. The Court further stated 
that while many factual issues existed, none of those were relevant because Still Standing 
could not show it was damaged by anything other than the lack of insured access. 
Consequently, the Court held that Still Standing was not damaged by the actions of 
Remax or Tim Shea. 
As the written order refers to the unambiguous explanation contained in the 
Court's oral findings and conclusions, the Court sees no need to alter the written order. 
Accordingly, the Court denies Still Standing's motion. 
m. Still Standing's Motion to Reconsider 
Still Standing asks the Court to reconsider its ruling granting summary judgment 
for Remme on Still Standing's affirmative claims. However, Still Standing does not 
present any new evidence or arguments to support its motion, but rather reasserts that 
access is a question of fact and that Tim Shea's actions were obviously negligent. Even 
if both of those assertions are true, this case has never been about whether access actually 
5049 
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existed; rather it is about Still Standing's undisputed inability to obtain insurance on an 
access to the property. By all accounts, the transaction failed because Still Standing 
could not guarantee access to the property, and thus provide marketable title. Therefore, 
the actual existence or non-existence of an access is irrelevant. Furthermore, as the Court 
already ruled, Tim Shea's alleged negligence is also irrelevant because Still Standing 
could not show damages resulting from anything other than the inability to insure an 
access. 
The Court denies the motion to reconsider. 
IV. Remax's Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint 
Remmc moves to dismiss Still Standing's second third-party complaint. The 
Court grants the motion. 
While Remax' s motion for summary judgment on the affinnative claims of Still 
Standing was still pending, Still Standing filed its second third-party complaint in 
response to Remax's amended pleading. Remax moves to dismiss the claims under the 
law-of-the-case doctrine because they are essentially identical to the ones the Court 
dimissed when it granted Rema,c' s motion for summary judgment. 
The law-of-the-case doctrine "provides that a decision on an issue at one stage of 
a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation." Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 
734, 739 (Utah 1990). Still Standing first argues that the law-of-the-case doctrine should 
not apply because the second pleading adds new third-party plaintiffs, Chuck 
Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code. This argument is without merit. As sellers in the same 
position as Still Standing, the deficiencies that doomed the claims of Still Standing, i.e., 
the inability to guarantee access as the sole reason the transaction failed, also condemn 
.Ci) 
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the same claims when brought by Schvaneveldt and Code. Consequently, the addition of 
new parties does not save or resurrect the claims that the Court has already dismissed. 
Still Standing further argues that these claims should fall wider one of the 
exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine, claiming that they are based on new evidence 
and that the prior decision was clearly erroneous. As Remme displays in its reply, 
however, the claims are not based on any new evidence. The facts show that the 
documents in Remmc's file were made available to Still Standing over four years ago. 
Thus, the new evidence exception is unavailing. Additionally, as the Court has already 
ruled above that it will not reconsider its decision to grant the motion for summary 
judgment that dismissed the claims, the Court is obviously not convinced that its prior 
decision was clearly erroneous. 
Consequently, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, Still Standing's second third-
party complaint must be dismissed because the Court previously dismissed those claims 
when it granted Rema}{' s motion for summary judgment. The Court grants Remax' s 
motion to dismiss. 
V. Still Standing,s Motion to Amend 
Still Standing requests in the alternative to its opposition to the motion to dismiss 
that the Court allow amendment of its pleadings. As the Court has already dismissed the 
claims that Still Standing seeks to add by amendment, and trial is less than three weeks 
away, the Court determines that amendment is not in the interests of justice. 
Accordingly, the Court denies Still Standing's motion to amend. 
.5051 
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In summary, the Court denies Still Standing's motion to enter rule 52 findings, 
motion to reconsider, and motion to amend. The Court also denies Remmc's rule 54(b) 
motion to certify. The Court grants Remax's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. 
Titls ruling constitutes the order of the Court. No further order under rule 7(f)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is necessary. 
Dated this J:/- day of July, 2012. 
5()52 
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seller's disclosures, provided two days after the REPC was 
signed, revealed that there was an issue with the access. And 
this is significant and Mr. Duncan mentioned it and while I 
got a glimpse of it this morning, I'd.never had a chance to 
fully absorb this, but I think it's a very good observation 
and it's this: At that point, however, the onus was on the 
buyer, not Tim Shea, to perform its due diligence and 
investigation the access, to see whether he wanted to proceed 
with the purchase. The REPC provided for a due diligence 
period which the buyer could back out of if it--if he had 
issues--if he had issues with the access, but the buyer did 
not object during that period. 
Now, if the buyer had objected during the due 
diligence period, defendant would have, in the Court's 
opinion, a much stronger argument that the plaintiffs are not 
entitled to a commission. 
In failing to object to the access issue during the 
due diligence period, the buyer essentially assented to 
continue with the sale despite the access issue. I mean, 
that's the natural consequence under the terms of the 
agreement. This is entirely different from Stewart, where the 
broker, buyer and seller all knew all along that there was 
contingency, which, if not met, ... would derail the transaction.· 
Where the due diligence period passed without 
objection, the contingency here was apparently waived and the 
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1 buyer gave up his right to object. 
2 Additionally, from that point on, what the seller 
3 had to do--had to sell and what the buyer purported to sell 
4 were the same, that is a cloud on that access unlike the facts 
s 
6 
7 
in Stewart. Here, all parties knew of the acces·s issue and 
all parties were apparently moving forward to closing in spite 
of the access issue. Consequently, the Stewart case is 
8 inapplicable to this case and the failure of the buyer to 
9 object to the access during the due diligence period is 
10 between the buyer and the seller. It in no way implicates the 
11 plaintiff's ability to recover a commission. 
12 Now, the Court is not opining on the merits of the 
13 case between buyer and seller, as that is not before the 
14 Court, but i~ theory, after the due diligence period, the 
15 buyer would not have a right to later back out of the 
16 purchase, due only to the access issue. Consequently, any 
17 
18 
failure to clqse would give rise to a breach of contract claim 
by the seller against the buyer. If the buyer did breach, the 
19 result of that action between the buyer and the seller would 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
be for specific performance or alternatively, damages. 
If the seller were awarded specific performance, it 
would be entirely equitable that the _plaintiff recover their 
comm_ission and you wouldn't argue with·that. 
Additionally, the seller would likely be entitled to 
recover the commission from the buyer, as it was the buyer's 
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·av:itr:b~ :~de~thrt:grteff~hf-s~~'rrJpt.~~;~-~- -m~. ·· .. ·-~~ .. ,w: . ~on ~-- s.-.. :.!U~f~-~/~!i~J&.·anctr.e..m~ Je.s 
8. ATTORNEY f-1:::ES. Except as provJded in Section 7, in sny :1c1ion or proceedit1y arising 0UI of tJ'\t$ Commission 
Agreement Involving the Sellttr ~'ld/or file Comp0ny. lhe prevailing pa,ty shaU be tn1illed tD reasonable eUomey fAP.~ and 
com. 
·-~~ ~~~1.tL~R:Alltttqffll:ATfPNS:.·,:_T:he;_~om~ny is·$Ul6oriz.,d 10 dlscJose l'ftP.:r dosing the fin3I terms and sares prictt uf 
·t.f.1.~ f~ope.,:1Y-,~,~~(oj~~~-M~~:='J~='.~ica~W.$:tXJ1ctrt;@FR@tppm·.n,t1~-~ 
·,p.- ATfACHMEN.](f.~,~q~··-:{J;~Re '.~)\ijf.;-ffO:r~~lfiHt1naf temis to this.Commission AgrAP.mMt. If .. yH•, soc 
~d~_nd~n:t - . .... . ..... -m.~~MUuto.:.1hlt Cott1'mtSSian Agreement by thls reference. 
1 f.-. .. J:QUAL Hp'c:~StffG_ '•oppoi:frt:JNi'ff _ ·Setler apd rt, e ·Con\psu,y agree lo c.omply With Feoeral, 3t8ltf, and local fair huus(ng law,. · ... · · · · · · · . 
12. FAX~s. Facsimlla (fax) transmission of a signed copy at thls Commlscion'Agreement, and retransn,Jsston of a signed 
rax. shaH be the same as delivery of an originaJ. tf this transaction involves multiple a..vnP.r.c. this Commission Agreement 
may b& executed In counter pa~. 
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13. ENTIRE AGReEMENT. This Commission Agreement. Including U\e Seller's Property Cotldll{on Olsdosure form. 
contain the entire agreement between the parties relatfng to the subJect matter ot this Commission Agreement. This 
Commlssfor, Agreement may not be modified or amended except fn writing signed by the parties h8tato. ; «::7~~~~~:~w_;•~ of~ ~:::::e~~f~oda~:~~:~~-
iq~.~:and ·carhy Codf'. . 
• ;;~~~--,. · •· ey: ~ndl'OUBl'aillch-Biokl!fl · • -
Tim Shea · M. Scott Quinney -· · · 
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REAL=,ES?ATE PIJRCKASE C.ONJ.RACT -- LAND 
This I• a 111~1.lillUl!nv cs,ntraf;t. If you dnlre fapl ar b"ic •~le!, eonrriiit your attorney w tax advr.or. 
EARNEST MONEY RECBPT 
·.. . 
Buyer Emmett Warren and pr Assigns offers to purchase the Property described below and hereby delive,s to \he 
--Brokerage, as·Eamest Money, the amaunt of $25Jlfm in lhQ form of Ql::f ~CK which, upon Acceptance of tilts offer by an 
. partltls (as defined In Soctlon 23), shall be deposited In accordance with statit·law. 
·Recetved by: ---------------~--- on . (Dais) (lfFa!M If~ ac:lu1awltd;N rocel#lt vf Eanwlsl Monllf) 
. --Brokerage: BeLMu EQte { L,aytpn Branch ) Phone Number: 80:J-825-3700 
. . . : . . . . . .. OFffR TO P_\JRCHASE . 
.... :- . ·1. PROPERTY: Land LLQ, sun ·stan~ing Stables atso described as: paa;e] # 23:;::006-00Qp City of HY~Ue .... : ·. 
· · · ._.Cou~of~ Stato of Utah. ZIP B!31Q (lhe "Property1. · · . 
: ~.1 Included ntm-.,(speclfy) _____________________ ~---
1.2 Water Rlahta/Water Stuarea. The folJowlng water rtghts and/or water share, are Included ln tht Purcltoae .Price. ] l----Shires of Stock In the _____________ (Name of Water Company) 
iXJ othtr (spectfy) Ajf rights attacb@d to h property and or pertafnjng 1° the Prm>trt)!.. 
,2.-PURCHA&E PRICI: The purchase prtce for tht Property 1s S436250,Q 
: The pun:hna prfco will -be paid as fcllaws: 
S.25.Q!m (1) Eameet Money Deposit. Under certain conditions deec:rlbed in this Contract THIS 
. DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTAUY NON-REFUNDABLE. · · 
$, _____ (b) New ~aan. Buyer 119rues to apply for. one or more of the following loans: 
r\ [X) CONVENTIONAL [ ] OllfER (spedfy) ____________ _ 
ff the roan ls·kl Include any paJ1icUlar terms. then check betbw and give details: [ JSPECIFI.CLOANTERMS ________________ _ 
$ . (~) Saller Financing. (no attached Seller Financing Addemium, If applieable) 
s~ ____ (d)Dther(spaclfy). ______ . ---------------$. _____ (a) Balanao of Purchase Price tn Cash at Settlement. 
S436250Q PURCHASE PRICE. Total Df fines (a) thraugh (a) 
3. SETTLEME!NT AND CLOSING. Settlement iman lake place on the Settlement Deadfine referenced lrt Section 24(c), or 
on a date upon which Buyer and Seller agrae tn writing. •satuement• shaU occur only Whun all of the following have been 
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller havo elgned and deftvered to each other or to the escrow/cloelng office all documents 
requlrud by lhls Contracrt. by the Lender, by written escrow Instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be 
paid by Buyer under thesa documents (except for the procueds or any new loan) have been dellvered by Buyer to Seller 
ar ta the escrow/closing office In the form of collected or cleared funds: and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller 
under these documents have been delivered ~Y Saller lo Buyer or to the escrow/dosing office In the fonn of collected or 
cleared funds. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half(¼) of tho fee charged by the ncrow/clostr,g office ror Its 
servJcos In the aefflemen1/ctoslng process. Taxes and assessmenta for the current year. rents. end Interest on assumed 
obtlgatfons shall be prorated at Settlement es set for1h In this Section. Praratlons set forth In this Sectfon shan be made aa 
of the Settlement Deadline date referenced In Section 24(c). untess otherwise agreed ta In writing by the parties. Such 
wtitfng could Include the settlement etatement. The transaction will be ccntldered closed when Settlement has been 
completed. and when an of the foUawlng ha\'e been completed: (I) the proceeds of any new loan have been detivoted by 
the Lender to Seaer or to the esc;row/closfng office: and ~Q the appllcabre Clostng documents have 1>een·reoorded In the 
office oflho county recorder. The actions described in parts (I) and (II) of the preceding sentence shall ba completed 
within four calendar days of 8$tUemenL . . 
4, POSSESSION, Seller shall dellver physical possession to Buyer wltnln: [X] Upon Closing [ ) Other (spec:ffy) 
S, CONFIRMATION OF A~ISCLOSURE. At the signing of tNs conn=: 
l J Seller's Initials ~er'a lnltia_ls . 
P$ge 1 of S pagoa SeU1J(i lnltiufs C, > Date Z- 7 ~ o( 8uyet's Initials ~ 
.___,) Oulu 
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. :Usting Agent ------------- ~presents [ J Seller [ ] Buyer [ J both Buyer and ~ell9r_ 
· . -· q_ail:.fmlti,cl Agent; 
. Listing Broker for • represents ( J Seflet [ ] Bl:IYBt" [ .f&oth Buytr11i\"i~aa1fai' . 
as ,I Llmllic;l•AVJ.nt; . (Company Name) 
Btiyer's Agent Tun-Shea, rapresencs f J Seller 1 J Buyer ( l both Buyer and Soller 
• · as a Lfmltad A9•nti . 
·-BUY,er'I Brokerfgr ·Romax Elite ( Scgtt QpJnne~}· repntsents [ 1 senlr [XJ'Buyer l J_both-BuyeraA_d-Self~r·~-~ : 
· (Company Natne1 · • 11 Umttid ~gent: 
. ·&. TITLE INSURANCE. At s,tdemont. Seller agrees to pay for a atandard-aav•rage owner's pollcy of ~~e:fn~u~nce . .· 
· rnaurtng Suye_t!n tht atnount of the Purcha• Prbl. Any addJtlonaf Ihle Insurance ~rage ahalt be at BU)'et'~:.e~~· · . 
·. 7. SB.LER DISC&.0$URl:S, Na later than the Sellar Dlsclosure.DeadDne referenced In Stction 24(a), Seller sh.aft provide · 
· · to Buyer the ftffloWln" dbtumants·.whfch. are colieattvoly refe,red .to ~s the "Seller 01sclosures": # :· • 
.. ·- (a) i Seller property 'COridttlon dlsdosuro for the-Property, $igned and dated by Seller; / 
· : ..... (b) ·a comrnbmentfot the po~ of .fflle Jnsurance; 
. ~(c) a oopy of a~ ,eases ~ng ~ Property not e><plring pl'ictr to Closing; 
· · ... (d) WriUon notice of ,ny cfalin& and/or conditfons known tQ S~ffer relati~ to enviranmontal pmbrems: 
·· (e) evidence~ any water rights and/or water shares reterem:ed in Section 1.2 above: end 
· :(f) 01her (specify) · · . · · · 
a. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER1S DUE DILIGENCE. Buyer't obligation to purchase U!)dor thfs 
Contract (Meck 1ppllcs11bf• bazea); 
(a) [)CJ rs I ·1 IS NOT conditioned upon B\l)'Gr's epproval ofth~ contuntof all thasetlerDlsclosures referenced In 
Section 7: 
(b) (X] 18 I J ts NOT cond'rtloned upon Buyer'1 approval of a physical condition Inspection of the Propertyi 
(c=) [ J 1$ (X] IS NOT 00ndltkmed upon Buyer's approval ate curveyofthe Property by a ftcensed surveyor; 
• (d) {X) 18 [ J IS NOT condition~ upon Buyer's apProval of appllcabfe federal, state and local UQVBfflmental lewa. 
ordinances and rugututlons affectfng 1he Property: and any applicable deed restrictions and/or CC&R's (covenanls, 
~ candltlona and restrfct1ons) aff~ng U,o Property. -
(e) lX) JS [ ] IS NOT c:ondlttoned upon the Property appraising for not loss than the Purchase. Price; . 
(1) [X] JS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer'a approval of1ho terms and condltfons of any mortgage financing 
refertnGed tn Suction 2 above: . 
(g) . (X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned UP.on Buyer• approval of the falloWlng tests end evaluatfcns of the·Property: (specify)·- . . 
SoJITut . . . 
rr any of itoma B(a) through 8(9) are checked rn the affl~atlvc. then Sections 8. 1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; alherwito, they 
do not apply. The Items checked In the affirmative above aro collecUvely refem,d to as Buyet's -Cue Dillgenc6." Unless 
otherwise provided In this Contract. Buyer's Due Dlllgenca shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conductsd by 
Individuals or entltfes of 8uyn cno1ce. Seiter agrees to cooperate with Buyer's Due DDl9enoe and with a final pre-closing 
fnspectlon under Section 11. 
a.1. Due Dllfgonco Daadflne. No later than 1he Due Olngance Deadline referenced In Suct10n 24(b) Buyer shalt: (a) 
ccmpJeta aD of Buyer's Due DDrgonc&; and (b) detonnlne if the retults of Buyer's Due OD1gen0a aro a=eptab!u to ewer, · 
I.Z Right to Can~J or ObJeGt. If Buyer detennlne, that the resuns of Buyet'a Due DDJ;ence are unacceplabfe, Buyer 
may. no later than th• Due Dlllqence Deadllne, either. (a) cancel thl1 Contract by providing written notice to Seifer, 
whereupon lh• ~ett Money Depoelt lhan bo- re!easud to Buyer. or Cb) provide Seller with written notice af obJeodans. 
S.3 FaUure to Respond. If by the eScplratfon of tho Dua Dtngonce D6adllno. Buyer doas not: (a) cancel .this Contract 
as provided 1n sectron 8.2: or (b) deliver a wrktan abJeetlon to Seller regarding the Suyen Due DfUgence, The B.uyer', 
Due Dlllgence ahall bo deemed approved by Buyer: and the cohllngencles referenced In Sections 8(a) through 8(g), 
lneludlng btA not tlrnJted to, any financing 00ntf nge11cy. shall be deemed waived by Buyur. · 
1,4 Response by 8111,r, If Buyer provld es wrttten objections to Seller, Buyer and SeUe-t 1hall have seven calendar 
dB.Y' after Seller's receipt of Buyer'e objection, (the •Responuq Period·) In which Co agree In writing upon tho manmtr of 
re$Olvlng 13uyar'a obJacttone. Except a& provided In Sect!on 10.2, Soller may, but shall not be n,qufred to, ""°Iva Buyer's 
0J)Joctlon,. If Buyer and sener have not agreed In wrlUng upon the manner of resolvlng Buyer's oblactlone, Buyer may 
cancel this Contrect by provldlnQ written notice to Saner no later than threo Galendar cfaY$ 1ner expiration of the Reeponse 
Period: whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released 10 Buyer. If this Contract ts nat canceled by Buyer under 
Olis SectJon 8.4, Buyer's obJectfon• •hall be deamad walved by Buyer. This waiver shall not affoct those Items wananted 
Paga 2 ors poga Sellm'a lnlllala ~ Date Z.. • 7 J () ~ BU)'<lfa ~ ")-2--::;-Date £- '• 0 6 
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In Sectlon 10. 
9. ADDmOHAL TERMS. There [ J ARE [ J ARE NOT addenda to this Contract ccntafnfng additional tenns. If ~rt are, 
_ ·. :lhtJ terms of the followlng .addenda are lncorp!>1'9ted into this Contract by this reference: [ J Addenda Nola __ .·.__ _ 
-( ] Selltr Financing A~dendum [ ] Othar.(spec:ifyJ __________________ _ 
10. SELLER WARRANTIES AND RePRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Titfe. Soller ropresentt that SeUer has foe title. to the Property and will convey good and marketable 
tJUe to Buyer at Clo$1ng by general wananty deed. auyer agrees, however, to accept tltle to lhe Property tubjeat to the 
fol1owJno matters of racord: easemonta, dNd restrictions. CC&R's (meaning covenants. conditions and rattrlo\lonu), and 
rights-of-way: 1nd sutJJeCt to the conten11 of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8. 
Buyer also agrees to take the Property 811bject to uxl&ting leases mfectlng the Property and not expiring prior to Closing. 
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes. assessments, homeowners association dues. utilltles, and other services 
proVfded to the Property after Clastng, Seller wlH cause to be-paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deedS, Judgment$, 
mecharilG'$ riens1 tax llans end warrants. Seller wiO cause to be paid current by Clostng an &1$assmen&1 and homeowners 
assoclatlan dues. 
IF ANY PORTION OF THE PROPERTY IS PRESE:NTLY ASSESSED AS "GREENBELT" (CHECK APPLICABLE 
BOX): 
[X] SELLEij .[ J BUYER SHALL BE RESPONSJBLE FOR PAYMENT OF ANY ROLL-SACK TAXES ASS.ESSEO 
AGAINST THE PROPERTY. 
1D.2 Candltlon of Ptopeny. Seller warrants that the Property wm be In the foHOWlngcondltlon ON THE DATE 
SELLS DBNERS PHYStCAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property ahaD be he of debt1a and personal property; 
(b) the P,operty will be In \he same general condition as It was on the date of Acceptance. 
11. FINAL PRE-ClOSING INSPECTION. Before Sett1em11nt. B\ly11r rnay. upon reasonable no1[ce and at a reasonable 
Ume, cqnduct a final pra•closlng inspection of tha Propurty to determine only that the Property Is •as roprosented,• 
meaning that the Pruperty has been repaired/corrected as agruud to ln SecUon B.4, and Is In the condition warranted i!1 
Socdon 10.2. If the Property 1$ not as represented, Sellar wm, prior to Settlement. repair/correct the Property, and place 
/\ the Property In the warranted condition or with the consent of Buyer (and Lender If appDcable), .esCIOW an amount at 
Settlem,nt •ufflqlent to provide far the samo. The failure to c;ondu~ a ftnal pre-closing lnapecUon or to claim that tha 
Property la not as rOi)rasented, shaU not can$\ltutB a waJver by Buyer of the right to ruaelvo, on 1he data Df possession, the 
Property u 111prasented. 
-~ 
12. CHANGES OURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from Iha deto of Acceptance untll Ul11 dqto of Cosing, none 
of 1h11 followlng 811110 occur without the prior written cansent of Buyar: (a) no changes In any existing leases shaP bet madei 
{b) no new leases shall ba entered ln1o: (c) no aubstantfal alteratlons or lmpravamenta to the Property •~all be mldo-or 
undert1tklm and {d) no furtner financlal enaumbrances affecting thu Prop~,ty &hall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY Of SIGNERS. If Buyer or ~bur Is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate. Umlted Uabillty company or 
other entity, the person exewdng this Contract on Its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and 
Sel!er. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with Its addenda, any attached eXhlbfts, and Seller 0lsdoiures, 
conat1tuto1 the entire Contract between tho parties end superiedes and replaces any and an prior negoUatJons, 
representations, warranties, undar.1tandlngs or contracts between the parties. ThlS Contract cannot be changed e~pt by 
written agf""11tnt of the parties. · · 
1&. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Tho parties agree that any dispute, eufslng prior to or after Closcng, ,vlated to th!$ Contra,;t 
(check appllcabla box) 
I JSFtALL . 
(XJ MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
fttst bo submitted to medlatfon. tr the parties agree to medlatJon. tha dlsputu shaa be submitted to mediation through a 
madfatiOn prowfar mutuaUy auirved upon by the partlBS. Each party agrees ta bear Jts awn costs of mediation. If medfatlon 
fail&, the au.er procedures and remedies avatlable Under thla Contract shlllJ apply. Nothing In this SecUon 15 shall prohibit 
any party from ••eking erne,geney equliable reRef Siendlng mediation. 
1 &. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, SeUer may elect either ta retain the Eemest Money Dsposlt at Dquldated damages, or to 
return Hand su, Buyer to •pecifioally enforce Ihm Ccntratil or puraue other remudtea avaftabkt at law. If Sonar detaults, ln 
addition to return of tha Ea~ Money Deposit. Buyer may olect elth,r to uCQJpt from Sauer a sum •qual to the Eamest 
Money Pepoalt as Uquldated damager., or may •ua SeHer to specfficatly enfon:e this Contract ar pursue other remedies 
avallable at law, If Buyer eJe_ota to accept liquidated damageai Saller agrees to pay 1he llqutdated damage, to Buyer upon 
Paga3 of s.,..._ Sel!Wa "1llhtla (!_ $ Datu Z. ~ 7 • 0 6 BUJO(S ln!~::S•---=:= ,_ 2- l.- db 
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" · demand. . 
.. · ·· 11.-ATTORNEY .f.EfS ANP ~-~TS • .ln the event of UUgation or b1ndlng ~rbitraUon to enforce this Contract. .. the prevafllng · · · . . _- .. 
· . ·party_shall 6e enUtled ti>.coitaand reasonable attorney-fees. HoWever. attomeyfeosshan not.be awardedJotpartlcipa11on • .. :· .-· .. .- ·:.: 
. . ..ln medfatJon und$r Section· 15. · · · 
· : · .. · .-18. _NOTICES. Ex~pt as provided ln Sedlon 23, an notices required '1tld_erthls Contract must~be: (a) .In wrttlng; ;(ti)jlgnbii 
·. :by the par1y_gMng notice; and .(c) re~lved by the ocher partY or the other party's agent no fat~r than-.tt\e appU¢abr .. ;,~te 
. .-·referenced In this Coptract. · 
· : .-: · 11 •. ABROOATION~.-Except far the provisions of Sections 10.1. 10.2, 15 and 17 and expre$s.warreJ'tles--m•ai:fe Jn·\hia 
·. . ·Contract; lt\e provisions of this contract .t1afl not apply after Cloefng. · 
· . ~--· _: 20.,JU.SK OF LOSSi All risk ot Jose to the Property, fncludlng phys1cal damage or destruction .to the~Propv'r\tor.ita 
.. _ lmp'ri>Vemonts-duo to any caus~ex~pt ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking 1n em!nent.dcmaln,-shafl be 
. . .: . :bomaby Soffer untU the ~n Is dosed. 
.. : 
• •• • 
. . :· .. .21. 1JME IS t)f THE ESSENCE. T1mo ls of the essence regarding 1he dates set fotth in this Contract. extensions must ba · . · ·· ·· 
· .· :agreed-to In~ by an patties. .Unless-otherwbe explfci11ystated in this Contract: (aJ performance under..eadl Section 
af thli-Contract whfch-refenmaes a date shah abactutely t;e.requlred by'5:00 PM Mountain Time on1ha $t&t~ .. date:-and 
· -•: · .'. (b)· the·term •d~ ~Eill_me~n ~lirydar days arid sl111U be aiunt~ct.begf11~ng on the day folkiWing the vvent .whicif~ters 
Utellmirn) requfremenf (I.a., ~nee, eta.). Perfarmancelfates!&nd limes ruf~ncerJ:.herafn:st:u1ll-nat beblndlnD:flPqrt · . 
. . :title compantes:Jenduri, appralaers-and others not partla to lhfs:C:ontraet. except as otharwlie:aori.!ed.-fo.fn:vnitlng_by · ... 
tuch non-pa,ty. · · · · · · · 
..... · .. : .'.12,,:FAX TRANSMISSION .AND <:9.UNTERPARTS, facslmJle (flll<) transml$slon of a ei9fla~ copy of thlS ,t:anhc;t, ·any . · · 
. · ·· .. ·~: •addenda and counteroff,re.--and'· the .retranemlsslon cf any signed Jax ehaB bathe ~""' as dellvery:of afr;O.ifglrial.:Thls . . · · .. ·. · · • • 
· :· · . · ._Ccih'tr_act and any addehcfa end .counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. _. . . · . : ~--. ->>:~-· 
.. · · . .i3'-ACCEPTANCE, •Aaceptaoa,• occura when Setter or Buyer, responding to an offar 0r counteroffer Of.P. other. (a) 
• . · : .-~slgjil '1G offerorcounteroffel:_Whe.rit !I~ to lndfcaie actepian~;.~nd-(b)communicataa totha other~~or-to·tha-othat 
·· · ·.- .party's agenttn'at the Offer ar .coUlltdroffer has been elgned es requireii. · 
f\ .· 2_4.-~0NTRACT PE'ADUNJ!S. Buyer and SeUtr agn:e that the following deadltnes shalt apply to.thbl Contra.ot .•· ·.. . ... 
. . . . . . .. Ja) ·~-D(odosu~ Dea,:lllna lf ~ 5 ~ '-'IL1"mW Atn el¥/{;. f.. · (D•t•) · .... 
:· . . . : ·(b) Du1-Dffl&eJtc& Deadline . "1D l>Ay ~ ~ .rJ4tT:rffJ fk~rtYl'¥tS (Date) . · 
. _.. ..(c) S.lllament D.eadllne 9o blf.tJ @lo,, Wg, m:r,, Aa;;me,g ~oat.) 
.: . . . . . . . . 
. ' .. 
. • ..... 
•: .... ·. 
. ··.· ... 
·. :: · : .. -~lr.OFPl!R.A~D.:TIME 'FOR ACCEPTA~CE. Buyer offars to .s,urcha&e 1he Pmper1y on the above termut,d cofiditiorii,·:ff · · . .. .. . . . . · 
: ·.:: . ~;.Sek d~uat acee'pt thlo ciffer ~ 4:J)Jl I 1 AM ,[XJ-PM Mountain Trme on JanyafY 23, 200Q.(Dat•l.-thls otre(ShaU . ·. . . _- . . . -~' .. 
· ·· . .-.Jcpse: a d the a.~~ralltJ shall retiJm .1ha Earnest Money .OepoSlt to Buyer. · · 
· .. · -.'7-a6 · 
-flik¥~Slgnature) (Offer Date) (Buyer'& Signature) (Otrer Date) 
The later of th11 abow Off•r Datoa shall be referred to a tt'le "Orrer Referen~e Datt,• 
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